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TURISDICnON:
Jurisdiction is granted to the Utah Court of Appeals by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Rule 3(a) which states in pertinent part:
"As provided and defined by law, an appeal may be taken from the final
orders and judgments of a district court, juvenile court, or circuit court to the Court
of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the particular court from
which the appeal is taken within the time allowed by Rule 4."
Pursuant to Title II, Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, this
appeal is taken from the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, Utah to the
Utah Court of Appeals.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES :
This appeal revolves around four central issues:
1) Whether the Court committed Reversible error by failing to make
findings to rebut the Uniform Child Support Guidelines as required by U.C.A.
§ 78-45-7, by failing to follow the Uniform Child Support Guidelines in
absence of findings to rebut the guidelines as required by U.C.A. § 78-45-7, and
by failing to follow other mandatory requirements of U.C.A. § 78-45 as they
relate to imputation of income and Plaintiffs responsibility to support the
parties' minor child;
2) Whether the evidence supported a finding that the Defendant was
willfully underemployed and whether the Court abused its discretion by
failing to make child support retroactive when the trial delay was not the
fault of the Defendant but the fault of the Court, and by imputing income to
Defendant based upon the arrearages incurred during the Court-caused delay;
3) Whether the Court denied the Defendant his Constitutional right of
equal protection of the law by requiring him to provide for the support of the
parties' minor child rather than requiring both parties to do so as required by
U.C.A. § 78-45-3 and U.C.A. § 78-45-4, and by allowing Plaintiff an opportunity
to complete her education while denying Defendant the same opportunity to
do so;
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4) Whether the Court practiced law from the bench in violation of the
Utah State Constitution when he gave legal advice to Plaintiff.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES:
The following statutes are determinative in this appeal:
United States Constitution, Amendment 14, Section 1
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 10
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-10.6 (2)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-3
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-4
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7 (2)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7 (3)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2 (1)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2 (2)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2 (3)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (1)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (2)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (3)
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Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (5)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (7)(c)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (7)(d)(iii)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.7
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.14

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
STATEMENT OF NATURE:
This appeal is from a final decree of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah
County, Utah, signed and filed June 25,1990, modifying a prior Decree of Divorce.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS:
1) Plaintiff initiated the original cause of action by filing a complaint for
divorce on August 24,1987, Civil No. CV 87-1946. Defendant responded by filing a
complaint for divorce, Civil No. CV 87-2002. The two causes of action were
consolidated by the Trial Court in October of 1987.
2) The Defendant was granted a divorce from Plaintiff by a Decree of Divorce
signed by the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen and entered with the Clerk of the
Court on November 30, 1988
3) Trial on the original cause of action was held in the Fourth Judicial District
Court of Utah County on Thursday, February 2. 1989, and Monday, February 6,1989,
and concluded on Thursday, February 9,1989.
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4) The Trial Court entered a Memorandum Decision with the Clerk of the
Court on April 25,1989.
5) Custody determination and property settlement were made, and Plaintiff
was granted a divorce from Defendant by a Decree of Divorce signed by the
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen and entered with the Clerk of the Court on May
16,1989.
6) The Defendant petitioned the Court for a Modification of the Divorce
Decree on September 25,1989, which was heard on June 20,1990. The Court entered
the order from which this appeal is taken on June 25,1990.
7) The Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on July 20,1990 with the clerk of the
trial court. The Defendant then filed a Docketing Statement for this matter with the
Clerk of the Court of Appeals on August 9,1990.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT:
This appeal is from a final decree of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah
County, Utah.

MATERIAL FACTS:
The Defendant was divorced from the Plaintiff by a Decree of Divorce signed
and entered with the Clerk of the Court on November 30,1988. Property settlement
and custody determination were finalized in a decree signed and entered with the

6

Clerk of the Court on May 16,1989. In this decree, Plaintiff was allotted alimony in
excess of $200 per month. The Defendant was ordered to pay child support of $174,
as per the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. In conjunction with this second
decree, Judge Cullen Y. Christensen saw fit to grant Plaintiff a decree of divorce from
the Defendant in addition to the court's prior divorce order.*
From the time of the initial filing of the divorce action, the Defendant has
voluntarily paid all child support and separate maintenance ordered by the court.
On June 17, 1989, Defendant was laid-off from his job due to organizational
changes.2 At this time, the defendant became unable to maintain his child support,
alimony, payments on marital debts, and living expenses.3 In early July of 1989, in
light of these circumstances, defendant requested Attorney Craig M. Snyder, to
initiate proceedings for a modification. The defendant vigorously sought
employment during this time.4
On July 5,1989, Defendant was offered a temporary full-time position with
the staff at BYU's Law Library. However, this position would become part time with
the initiation of the new school year.5 At this time the defendant made the

1
2

Record, page 168, "Decree of Divorce;" and page 218, "Memorandum Decision."
Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 18, line 5.

3

Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 36, line 24; and page 309, Tables, "Order
Modifying Decree of Divorce."
4

Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 18, line 21.

5 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 19, line 12.
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determination that it would be necessary to complete his degree, before any career
advancement could be possible.^
Mr. Snyder filed Defendant's Petition for Modification on September 25,
1989.7 The modification was to be heard by Judge Christensen. This matter was
docketed for pre-trial or trial hearing on multiple occasions, including the eventual
hearing on June 20, 1990.8
Due to Judge Christensen's illness, injuries, and subsequent recuperation, the
matter was repeatedly postponed. The hearing was further delayed when a pro
tempore judge refused to hear the case citing the complexity of the issues.9 In the
interim, Defendant was again involuntarily released from employment, this time
from the Law Library on April 26,1990.10 Diligent effort was made by Defendant to
secure employment from that time until the time of the trial.11 On June 20,1989,
the case was eventually heard by Judge Christensen, who delivered his decision

6

Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 19, line 18.

7

Record, page 271, "Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce."

8 Record, page 328 line 7 through line 20, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 61. (See also:
page 271, "Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce; " page 292, "Request for Trial Setting;"
page 297, "Notice of Pre-Trial;" page 298, "Trial Date Scheduled;" page 299, "Minute Entry" by
Judge Allen B. Sorensen; and page 300, "Trial."
9 Record, page 299, "Minute Entry" by Judge Allen Sorensen.
10 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 20, line 9.
ii Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 36, line 22.
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from the bench.*2 The written Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, including the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, was signed and entered with the Clerk of
the Court on June 25,1990.13
Defendant brings this appeal requesting the decision be reversed and
remanded for rehearing asserting that the trial court's decision reflects manifest
error, abuse of discretion, and violation of Defendant's Constitutional right to equal
protection of the law.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT:
Defendant brings this appeal based upon four issues: 1) Reversible Error, 2)
Abuse of Discretion, 3) Denial of Defendant's Constitutional Rights, and 4) the
Practice of Law by the Court.

REVERSIBLE ERROR:
The Trial Court committed several reversible errors in this case. First and
foremost, the Court failed to follow or properly enter findings to rebut the
legislative presumptions found in Utah State Law under Sections 78-45-7 and 7.2.
Pursuant to this statute, the Court is required to use both parties' financial positions
in determining a support award pursuant to statute and recent case law, which this

12

Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 56, line 19.

13 Record, page 311, "Order Modifying Decree of Divorce."
9

Court failed do. Both Parties were unemployed at the time of the trial. Both parties
had been working from the time of the Petition for Modification until some time
shortly before the date of the actual hearing. But the Court only used the
Defendant's (imputed) income in determination of the support award. As such, the
Court constructively refused to follow the Utah Code.
U.C.A. § 78-45-7.2 requires the Court to apply the guidelines unless the
evidence rebuts the presumptions in the statute. The Court, however, by failing to
find evidence to rebut U.C.A.§78-45-7.2, became subject to U.C.A. § 78-45-7 (3). The
Court found that there was a matericd change of circumstances, constructively
rebutted the guidelines but then failed to present specific findings of fact as required
by the statute. Specifically, the Court failed to address:
a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
f) the age of the parties;
g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others. 14
In several cases on point heard this year, the Utah Court of Appeals held that
such an omission constituted reversible error. First, in Tefferies v. Tefferies, (752 P.2d
909 (Utah App. 1988)) and then again in Ostler v. Ostler (789 P.2d 713, Utah App.

14 Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7 (3).
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1990) the Court of Appeals stated that because these factors "constitute material
issues," that "failure to enter specific findings on each of the factors is generally
reversible error."15 The Court of Appeals later supported the Ostler Court's decision
in Durfee (Wolf) v. Durfee (140 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah Ct. App. August 9,1990))
and again in Allred v. Allred (141 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah Ct. App. August 13,
1990)) by reversing and remanding both cases due to the trial courts' failure to enter
specific findings on each of the above issues after a material change in circumstances
had been found.16
Additionally, the Court committed reversible error by imputing income to
the Defendant when such imputation is in direct violation of Utah statute. U.C.A. §
78-45-7.5 (7) (d) states in pertinent part that
"Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to
establish basic job skills;"17
The Court also committed reversible error by failing to follow Utah Statute
and failing to recognize in any way the Plaintiff's responsibility to support the
parties' child, pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-45-4. This is not to the exclusion of the
Defendant's responsibility under U.C.A. § 78-45-3, but rather to the combination of

15 Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 911; See also Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d, at 715.
16 See also: Layton v. Layton, 111 P.2d 504 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (Remanded on lack
of sufficient findings), Bake v. Bake, 772 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (Similarly remanded
on lack of sufficient findings), and Johnson v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 696 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(Also remanded on lack of sufficient findings).
17 Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (7) (d) (iii)
11

responsibility in equal part of the parties. The parties share the responsibility coequally, without regard to custody or gender.is The Court is also directed to require
of both parties employment history and other financial data in determining a just
award. 19 Instead, the Court based its findings solely on the Defendant's imputed
income, even after being informed by Counsel as to the need for equality in this
matter.20

ABUSE OF DISCRETION:
The Court abused its discretion by finding that the Defendant was willfully
underemployed. Such a finding, however, is completely unsupported by the
evidence presented at trial. The only evidence presented at trial was Defendant's
testimony regarding his search for employment during his two periods of
unemployment. The Defendant believed that to continue his basic educational
pursuits was sanctioned by the Court due to the fact that it had openly supported
Plaintiffs efforts in doing so, and that the original decree made mention of that
intention and was silent as to any objection to doing so.21 Furthermore, the

18 Allred v. Mired, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 (quoting 98 A.L.R.3d 1146, 1150 (1989)).
19 Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.5 (5) (b), (1989). Defendant voluntarily
submitted this information.
20 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," pp. 56, line 5, through 57, line 9.
21 Record, page 227, paragraph 8, "Memorandum Decision."
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Defendant testified that he searched diligently for employment both in June of 1989
and again in Spring of 1990 and no evidence was ever presented to the contrary.22
The Court also abused its discretion by imputing income based upon its
erroneous finding that Defendant was willfully underemployed and upon
arrearages incurred by the Defendant prior to the trial. Had the Court heard the case
in a timely manner, the arrearages would have been relatively insignificant.
Indeed, the Defendant would have been only $335 in arrears of Child Support,
instead of $1,562.89 as claimed by Plaintiff and supported by the Court.23 Public
policy and due process considerations suggest that the Defendant's case should not
be jeopardized or in any way prejudiced by actions of the Court or any third party.
The Court abused its discretion by failing to make its order for modified
support retroactive to the date of filing of the petition for modification, pursuant to
U.C.A. § 30-3-10.6. The Court's refusal to make the order retroactive is based solely
upon the erroneous finding that Defendant has not been diligent in paying support
and is supported in its entirety by the level of arrearages.24 Again, had the
Defendant been given an opportunity to have his petition heard within a reasonable
period of time, such arrearages would be negligible. The purpose of the policy of
retroactivity under the statute is to provide the petitioner with a position as though

22 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 18, line 2 1 , p. 2 1 , line 9, and p. 36,
line 22.
23 Record, page 309, "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law", Table of support.
24 Record, page 328,, "Transcript of Hearing," pp. 60, line 25,through page 61, line 20
(See also Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 69, line 9.)
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the case had been heard upon the filing of the petition, thus removing any bias
created by the Court's delay, whether or not that delay was reasonable.

DENIAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
The Court denied Defendant's rights under the Utah and the United States
Constitutions. First, the Court refused to allow equal educational opportunity to the
parties. The Court has allowed the Plaintiff to continue her educational pursuits but
has effectively denied the Defendant's desire to do likewise.25 The Court also
refused to apply statues equally. U.C.A. § 78-45-3 and § 78-45-4 succinctly declare
both father and mother to be equally responsible in the support of their children.
The Court, however, required only the Defendant (father) to provide for his child.
Even upon recommendation of Counsel to consider Plaintiff's financial potential in
addition to the Defendant's, the Court refused to consider anything but the
Defendant's (imputed) income. Such a position is clearly a denial of equal
protection of the law pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14 Section 1,
and is therefore reversible error.

PRACTICE OF LAW FROM THE BENCH:
Finally, the Court violated the Utah State Constitution by advising and
encouraging Plaintiff on four separate occasions to submit proper filings in the

25 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 57, line 2.
14

future regarding reinstatement of alimony.26 The Court went so far as to determine
what level of alimony would be awarded upon such filing. Such action constitutes
the practice of law and is contrary to the Utah Constitution, Article VII, Section 10.

CONCLUSION:
Based, therefore on the manifest, reversible error of the Court, the Court's
abuse of Discretion, the manifest denial of the Defendant's Constitutional rights,
and the Court's practice of law from the bench, Defendant prays the Utah Court of
Appeals to reverse the decision of the Trial Court, and remand the matter back to
district court for a fair and impartial hearing.

ARGUMENT:
Defendant brings this appeal based upon four issues: 1) Reversible Error, 2)
Abuse of Discretion, 3) Denial of Defendant's Constitutional Rights, and 4) The
Practice of Law by the Court from the bench.

26 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 7, line 13, p. 61, line 13, p. 62, line
10, and p. 63, line 10.
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REVERSIBLE ERROR:

FAILURE TO FOLLOW OR REBUT CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES.

The Trial Court committed several reversible errors in this case. First and
foremost, the Court failed to follow or properly enter findings to rebut the
legislative presumptions found in Utah State Law under Sections 78-45-7 and 7.2.
U.C.A. § 78-45-7.2 states in pertinent part:
"The guidelines apply to any judicial or
administrative order establishing or modifying an award
of child support entered on or after July 1,1989."27
These guidelines provide that a proportionate contribution toward support must be
made by each parent. In Allred v. Allred, (141 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, (Utah Ct. App.
August 1989).), the Court held that the guidelines must be followed unless the trial
court found them to be improper. If the trial court finds the guidelines to be
improper then it is required to make specific findings as to why it did not follow
them.28 Thus the Court is required to use both parties' financial positions in
determining a support award. (See U.C.A. § 78-45-7.7 and 7.14) In this case, the trial
court failed to do so. Both parties had worked until just prior to trial on
modification. However, the trial court only imputed income to the Defendant and

27 Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2 (l)(a).
28 Allred v. Allred, 141 Utah Adv. Rep, at page 16, and footnote 3, page 17.
16

none to the Plaintiff.29 As such, the Court did not follow the guidelines. It was then
required to make specific findings which it did not do.
U.C.A. § 78-45-7.2 requires the Court to apply the guidelines unless rebutted.
It states:
"a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a
rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the
amount of temporary or permanent child support.
"b) the rebuttable presumption means the provisions and
considerations required by the guidelines and the award
amounts resulting from the application of the guidelines
are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the
provisions of this section. "30
When a court fails to follow the guidelines, it becomes subject to U.C.A. § 7845-7 which states:
"Prospective support shall be equal to the amount
granted by prior court order unless there has been a
material change of circumstance on the part of the obligor
or obligee. "31
It further states:
"If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the
guidelines, the court shall establish support after
considering all relevant factors including but not limited
to:
a) the standard of living and situation of the
parties;

29

Record, page 306, lines 13 through 22, "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law."

30 Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2 (2) (a) and (b).
31 Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7 (1).
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b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
f) the age of the parties;
g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others.32
The Court found that there was a material change of circumstance, did not follow
the guidelines, and failed to make findings of fact as required by the statute when it
chose to disregard the guidelines. For example, it did not make findings as to the:
a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
b) the ability of the obligor to earn;
c) the ability of the obligee to earn;
d) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
e) the age of the parties.
In several cases on point, the Utah Court of Appeals held that such an
omission constituted reversible error. In Tefferies v. Tefferies (752 P.2d 909 (Utah
Ct.App. 1988)), the Utah Court of Appeals held that the above factors "constitute
material issues upon which the trial court must enter findings of fact."33 The

32 Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7 (3).
33
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Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 911.

Tefferies Court went on to state that "the failure to enter specific findings on each of
the factors is generally reversible error. "34
In Ostler v. Ostler (789 P.2d 713, (Utah App. 1990)) the Utah Court of Appeals
found again that failure to enter specific findings on each of the elements of U.C.A. §
78-45-7 constituted reversible error.35 in the Ostler case, the factual pattern differed
from the present case only in that the material change of circumstances was
stipulated to instead of made by a finding of the Court. Additionally, the father's
income was found to have increased instead of decreased as in the instant case.
In all other aspects Ostler and Tefferies were similar factually as the instant
case. In Ostler, the trial court had made findings regarding the changes in income
which were more specific than the findings in the instant case. The Ostler Court
found that even with more specific findings, the findings of the trial court were still
too ambiguous to be useful.36 The net result was that the Ostler trial court had made
an award but it did not fit the guidelines as specified in U.C.A. § 78-45-7.7 and 7.14,
and the guidelines were thus not rebutted as permitted by U.C.A. § 78-45-7 (3). The
Ostler court stated:
"While the trial court made findings of fact, we cannot
determine to what extent these factors were applied."37

34

Id.

35 Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d at 715, (quoting Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 911).
36 Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d at 715.
37 Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d at 715.
19

In the instant case, however, no findings of fact are made with regard to any of the
required factors.
The Court of Appeals later cited the Ostler Court's decision in Durfee (Wolf)
v. Durfee (140 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (August 9,1990)). The Appellant's counterpetition
was denied on every point except for the court's failure to enter specific findings
regarding these issues. The Durfee Court cited Ostler:
" 'The [trial court's] apportionment of financial
responsibility between the parties will not be upset on
appeal unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the
contrary or we determine that the court has abused its
discretion.' 38 We find that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to enter sufficient findings of fact to
support the child support awarded." 39
The Utah Court of Appeals again approved the Ostler decision in Allred v.
AUred (141 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (August 13, 1990).) when it overturned the trial
court's child support award based upon the trial court's failure to present findings
on the seven factors. The Allred Court noted that the trial judge had actually made
findings regarding some of the required factors, but that because the findings were
incomplete, "the findings as a whole [were] insufficient. "40

38 Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d at 715 (citations omitted).
39 Durfee (Wolf) v. Durfee, 140 Utah Adv. Rep. at 43.
40 Allred v. Allred, 141 Utah Adv. Rep., at page 5.
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The Allred Court was specific with regard to explaining how apportionment
of responsibility is to take place. Quoting 98 A.L.R.3d 1146,1150 (1980), the Allred
Court noted:
"The trend of the law today is 'toward equal rights
and responsibilities for women...requiring that the wife
contribute child support if she is financially able in an
amount approximately proportional to her financial
ability.' (Propriety of Decree in Proceeding Between
Divorce Parents to Determine Mother's Duty to Pay
Support for Children in Custody of Father). Although
apparently never addressing this precise issue before, Utah
appellate courts have recognized that 'both parents have
an obligation to support their children.' Woodward v.
Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) (per curiam).
This notion of equal responsibility is also apparent as a
matter of statutory law in Utah. (U.C.A. § 78-45-3, -4. Utah
statues draw no distinction in terms of support duty
between custodial and non-custodial parents nor between
fathers and mothers. The duty of both is the same."41
The Allred Court went on to say that U.C.A. § 78-45-7.7 (1990) required the
same analysis as set out in 98 A.L.R.3d. 1146,1150 (1980).

The status of the law, therefore, is quite clear. Failure to present specific
findings regarding :
a) the standard of living and situation of the
parties;
b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;

41 Allred v. Allred, 141 Utah Adv. Rep., note #3, at 17.
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c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
f) the age of the parties;
g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others,
constitutes reversible error.42

IMPROPER IMPUTATION OF INCOME.
The Court committed reversible error by imputing income to the Defendant
when such imputation is in direct violation of Utah statute. U.C.A. § 78-45-7.5 (7)
(d) states in pertinent part that:
"Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training
to establish basic job skills;1'43
The Plaintiff is pursuing basic college level education. Likewise, the
Defendant desires to do the same. Both parties are attempting to develop basic
occupational training to establish basic skills in their area according to their desires
and abilities. The purpose of the provision to restrain the court from imputing
income is simply to afford individuals the opportunity to better their position so as
to more adequately support their families and children and not be a burden on

42 Allred v. Alfred, 141 Utah Adv. Rep., at 15.
43 Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (7) (d) (iii)
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society. But the Court in this case did not recognize this fact. It either had to impute
income to both or to neither.

FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE LAW:
The Court also committed reversible error by failing to recognize in any way
that the Plaintiff has a responsibility to support the parties' child as well as
Defendant. (See U.C.A. § 78-45-4) This is not to the exclusion of the Defendant's
responsibility under U.C.A. § 78-45-3, but rather is in addition to Defendant's
responsibility. The Court must require of both parties evidence of employment
history and other financial data before making a just award. 44 Instead, the Court
based its findings solely on the Defendant's imputed income, even after being
informed by Counsel as to the need for equality in this matter.4^

ABUSE OF DISCRETION:
IMPROPER FINDING OF WILLFUL UNDEREMPLOYMENT:
The Court abused its discretion by finding that the Defendant was willfully
underemployed and/or unemployed. Such a finding is completely unsupported by
the evidence presented at trial. The only evidence presented at trial was

44 Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.5 (5) (b), (1989).
45 Record, page 328, 'Transcript of Hearing," p. 56, line 5 , through p. 57, line 9.
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Defendant's testimony regarding his search for employment during his two periods
of unemployment. In direct examination regarding the first period of
unemployment, the Defendant was asked:
"After, following June 17th of 1989, how long was it
before you obtained other employment?"
The Defendant responded:
"[It] would have been about three weeks. I looked
first for full time employment, could not find any, and so
was hired-on part-time at the BYU Law Library, though I
was allowed to work extra hours for the first couple of
months." 46
In further direct examination, this time regarding the second period of
unemployment, the Defendant was asked:
"Now, following April the 27th of 1990, what have
you done with regard to employment and your
schooling?"
To which the Defendant responded:
"...since then, not having been employed, I have been in
school full time, still I have been, during the off hours,
looking for part-time employment, preferably at BYU so I
can maintain close proximity to job and work, or work
and school rather, so that I can facilitate going to classes
and the like."47
In cross examination, the Defendant was also asked:
"What or when was the last time you looked for
work?"

46 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 18, line 19.
47 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 21, line 1. (Emphasis added)
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The Defendant answered:
"It would have been last Friday. I went into the
[campus] employment office and then, well, in fact last
night I talked to a friend of mine who is a contractor, and I
called him to see if he had any additional work that he
needed.
Counsel then asked:
"What type of work are you looking for, Mr.
Pickard?"
The Defendant answered:
"Right now, I'm looking for something preferably
with a construction emphasis, though I am not limiting it
to that, simply because I need some hands-on experience
in my field."48

The Defendant therefore made two references to the fact that he was not limiting his
search to include only BYU employment and testified to the fact that he had made at
least one successful contact outside BYU within the past week. The trial judge,
however, disregarded this fact, interpreting the testimony to reflect upon
Defendant's efforts as a whole. The Defendant, however, at no time suggested that
he was unwilling to work or to find suitable employment.
Furthermore, the Court, in its original decision, acknowledged the fact that
Plaintiff was enrolled in college at Utah Valley Community College and expected to
complete her degree in the Spring of 1990. Evidence showed that the State of Utah

48

Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 36, line 22 to p. 37, line 6. (Emphasis

added.)
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had funded Plaintiffs education,^ beginning in 1983 until 1989 in an amount
exceeding $17,000.00.50 In 1989, the Court found that Defendant intended to pursue
the final portion of his educational however, the Court did not address whether it
was proper or improper for Defendant to continue his education, while apparently
approving Plaintiffs educational pursuits.

The Defendant testified that he searched diligently for employment both in
and outside of BYU's employment office, and that though he preferred to work in
the construction (or related) industry, he was not limiting his search to construction
alone.5^ He testified that in June of 1989 and again in Spring of 1990 the job market
was tight and that no significant offers had been made and that he did his best to
find adequate employment and continue paying support, and no evidence to the
contrary was presented. 53 Defendant testified that upon obtaining subsequent

49 Record, page 321, "Defendant's Exhibit No. 18."
50

Record, page 227, "Memorandum Decision."

51 Record, page 227, paragraph 8, "Memorandum Decision," p. 10.
52 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 37, line 2.
53 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 18, line 21; p. 21, line 9; and p. 36,
line 22.
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employment, Defendant was willing but unable to comply completely with the
support order due to his greatly reduced earnings and capability to pay.54
There was no evidence to support the position of willful unemployment or
that to temporarily limit work in order to better one's position is out of line with
what the Court and the State of Utah had actively encouraged Plaintiff to do.

IMPROPER IMPUTATION OF INCOME TO DEFENDANT:
The Court also abused its discretion by imputing income based upon its
erroneous finding that Defendant was willfully underemployed and upon
arrearages incurred by the Defendant prior to the trial. Had the Court heard the case
in a timely manner, the arrearages would have been relatively insignificant.
Indeed, the Defendant would have been only $335 in arrears of Child Support,
instead of $1,562.89 as claimed by Plaintiff and supported by the Court.55
The Court, however, placed great emphasis on the fact that Defendant had
become $1,600 behind in his payments. The Court stated:
"I have concern about looking at your schedule.
This man has paid very little over the period of time
[since June, 1989]."56

54 See generally, Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," pp. 17 - 25, and p. 38, line
13 to p. 40, line 10..
55 Record, page 309,"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law", Table of support.
56 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p.61, line 1.
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Imputation of income, however, is not allowed. As noted above, U.C.A. § 78-45-7.5
(d)(iii) prohibits imputation of income when a parent is engaged in basic
occupational training. Both parties have received equivalent levels of education
and have both been gainfully employed.57
The argument could be pursued that skills obtained in a college setting may
be beyond the scope of this statute. The statute, however, specifically allows for both
career and occupational training to establish basic skills of onefs chosen occupation.
Furthermore, the Court has allowed Plaintiff to continue her college education,
presumably on the basis that she is obtaining a basic college education to better her
position. For the Court to now determine that Defendant is not allowed to do the
same is simply unjust and violates the equal protection clause of the U.S. and Utah
Constitutions.
Public policy and due process considerations suggest that the Defendant's case
should not be jeopardized or in any way prejudiced by delay of the Court and that
interpretation and application of the law must be evenhanded. 58

57 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 58, line 7.
58

U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14, Section 1, which is also applicable to the states via
case law, and Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7.
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FAILURE TO MAKE MODIFIED ORDER RETROACTIVE:
U.C.A. § 30-3-10.6 states in pertinent part:
M

A child or spousal support payment under a child
support order may be modified with respect to any period
during which a petition for modification is pending, but
only from the date notice of that petition was given to the
obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner."^
No case has squarely addressed this issue to date, though it is reasonable to believe
that the statute is intended for cases such as the instant case as follows:
Defendant filed the Petition for Modification on September 25,1989. Due to
the illness, injury and necessary recuperation of Judge Cullen Y. Christensen, the
pre-trial conference was not scheduled until March of 1990.60 During this time, the
Defendant found his financial situation deteriorating to the point that, although
barely able to pay for minimal immediate living expenses, he was unable to meet
any other obligations, thus also temporarily unable to meet the support order.61
Judge Christensen's recuperation prevented his attendance at the subsequent
hearing set for March 30,1990, nor was he able to attend the trial scheduled for May
10,1990, at which time Judge Sorensen, temporarily assigned to hear Judge
Christensen's cases, refused to hear the case due to it's complexity. The eventual

59 U .C.A. § 30-3-10.6 (2) (1989)
60 Record, page 288, "Notice of Pre-Trial Settlement Hearing."

61 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 38, line 25 through p. 39, line 8.
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trial date was set for June 20,1990, a full nine (9) months from the date of the
original petition, and more than a year from the actual change in circumstances.
The Court remarked:
"I understand that, Mr. Snyder, you filed [the petition] in
August of 1989 or thereeibouts. The Court's finding is,
however, he has not applied himself as well as he might.
And now to come in and ask the Court to relieve him of
that obligation with that position, the Court is not
inclined to do so. I'm not going to make it retroactive."62
Had the Defendant been granted trial within a reasonable time, the arrearages
claimed by Plaintiff would have been insignificant. The delay alone, unduly
prejudiced the Defendant's position.^ The Court's refusal to make the order
retroactive is based solely upon the erroneous finding that Defendant has not been
diligent in paying support and is supported in its entirety by the level of arrearages. 64
Certainly, it is not fitting to assess any party with the entire impact of the court's
delay, whether or not the court held in that party's favor.
Furthermore, the purpose of the doctrine of retroactivity under the U.C.A. §
30-3-10.6 is precisely to provide the petitioner with a position of no delay, as though
the case had been heard upon the filing of the petition, thus removing any bias
created by the delay. To support denial of the doctrine of retroactivity with a finding
based upon the effects of the delay seems nonsensical. The Court held that, indeed,

62 Record, page 328, "Transcript of hearing," p. 61, line 11.
63

See Supra, note 51.

64 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," pp. 60, line 25, through 61, line 20.
(See also Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 69, line 9.)
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a material change of circumstances had occurred, ostensibly due to Defendant's
unemployment. The Court held, however, that regardless of Defendant's inability
to pay, Defendant would be held to the original support ordered; this conclusion
being based in significant part upon the amount of support remaining unpaid. The
faulty circular logic becomes apparent.

DENIAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT 14, SECTION 1:
Finally, the Court denied Defendant's rights under the Utah and the United
States Constitutions. First, the Court refused to grant equal protection or
opportunity to the parties. The Court has allowed the Plaintiff to continue her
educational pursuits but has effectively denied the Defendant's request to do
likewise. 65
During the oral decision, the Court commented:
"I think the decision to go to school, while a
laudable one, under some circumstances may be very
good. But when one has the obligation to support, as does
Mr. Pickard, I don't think you are in a position to make
those decisions or put yourself in a position, even though
ultimately you hope to gain a situation where you may be
better off financially and able to pay a greater amount."66
Counsel for Defendant then reminded the Court that Defendant testified in the
original trial that he had quit school to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to continue

65 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 57, line 2.
66 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 57, line 3.
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her education, that Defendant had intended to complete his schooling and that both
parties had been employed for the duration of the marriage. Counsel then made
reference to Utah law by stating:
"...I think it is significant that that testimony was
offered then and that Mrs. Pickard, if anything, has the
same kind of duty of support and earnings. And if she is
in fact cured of her emotional disturbances, she has a duty,
the same type of duty to be going out and earning support.
She has been continuing her education as well."67
The Court responded:
"I'm aware of that situation, Mr. Snyder, and
recognize that health circumstances often change plans of
many people. But the fact remains that this man has a
child, has some abilities, he isn't incapable of, he has not
physical infirmities, he has good skills, he has some ability
to earn and ability to work if you will. Lots of people go to
school and work full time to assume their
responsibilities."^
The Court could have made the same statement about the Plaintiff. In this
statement, the Court refused to consider both parties' responsibility to support the
parties' child. Quoting 98 A.L.R. 1146 and by citing Utah law, the Allred Court,
however, declared that responsibility for support must be held co-equal by both
parents.69
Thus, in spite of the fact that U.C.A. § 78-45-3 and § 78-45-4 clearly and
succinctly declares both father and mother to be equally responsible in the support of

67 Id, p.59, line 3.
68 Id, at line 10.
69 See Supra, note 30.
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their children, the Court required only the Defendant (father) to provide for his
child. Such a position is clearly a violation of the equal protection clause, in
opposition to public policy set out in U.C.A. § 30-3-10.6, and thus reversible error.

UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 10:
Additionally, the Court violated the Utah State Constitution, Article VIII,
Section 10, by encouraging Plaintiff on four separate occasions to submit proper
filings in the future regarding reinstatement of alimony. First, as opening remarks
began, Mr. Butterfield attempted to have the issue of reinstatement of alimony
subsequent to an alleged annulment of the Plaintiffs re-marriage heard by the Court.
Counsel for Defendant objected, stating that it was not reserved in the pre-trial order
and that Counsel for Plaintiff had represented to the Court and to Counsel that no
such claim would be made. 70 The Court sustained the objection, and then
encouraged Plaintiff to pursue the issue by saying:
"I'm not precluding you however from raising that
issue in some subsequent proceedings."
Counsel for Plaintiff responded:
"That's okay with us!"7i

70

Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 6, line 5.

71 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 7, line 13.
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The Court again recommended Plaintiff take future action by indicating the
amount the Court would order as alimony in the event of such future consideration
and that it would make such alimony retroactive to the date of her remarriage. 72
The Court then advised Counsel that the issue might be brought before the Court
"by memorandum or appropriate filings." Finally, the Court reaffirmed its
assessment of $100 per month upon proof that the annulment did, in fact, exist.73
Certainly this kind of advice is unnecessary for an accomplished attorney
such as Mr. Butterfield, Counsel for Plaintiff. Mr. Butterfield has been a member of
the Bar for some time and has gained substantial experience and knowledge as to
how to bring a matter before the court. Therefore, the advice relayed to Counsel
regarding the necessity and method of future filings is highly improper conduct for
any judge, as such action constitutes the practice of law.
"Supreme court justices, district court judges, and
judges of all other courts of record while holding office
may not practice law..." Utah Constitution, Article VIII,
Section 10.

72 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p.61, line 17.
73 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p.63, lines 10 through 21.
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CONCLUSION:
Based, therefore on the manifest, reversible error of the Court, the Court's
abuse of Discretion, the manifest denial of the Defendant's Constitutional rights,
and the unlawful practice of law by this Court, Defendant prays the Utah Court of
Appeals to overturn the decision of the Trial Court, and remand the matter back to
district court for a fair and impartial hearing.

DATED tms

day of

, 1990.

Keith F. Pickard, pro se
Defendant and Appellant.
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was before him, rather than invoking the
doctrine of res judicata. Rule 65B(iX2) is
designed to prevent successive petitions for
a writ based on identical grounds, a potential abuse of the judicial system. 1 The rule
provides that a court should dismiss a petition if "it is apparent . . . that the legality
or constitutionality of [the petitioner's] confinement has already been adjudged in [prior habeas corpus or other similar] proceedings."

OSTLER v. OSTLER
65B(i) petition was exactly the same as uv
one denied by Judge Daniels in CandeUrio's first habeas corpus petition.2 JUAV
Rokich's dismissal was therefore correct
although his reliance on res judicata wa«
unnecessary; he could simply have declined
reconsideration of the double jeopardy
claim under rule 65B(i)(2). The result
would have been the same if Judge Rokich
had denied the writ under rule 65B(i)(2)
however, and his reliance instead on the
doctrine of res judicata did not affect Can
delario's rights.

This Court recently construed rule
65B(iX2) in Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029
(Utah 1989):
A ground for relief from a conviction or
[3 J Judge Rokich's dismissal of Candesentence that has once been fully and lario's due process claim was also approprifairly adjudicated on appeal or in a prior ate. Candelario argues that he did not
habeas proceeding should not be readju- receive notice of the second hearing on an
dicated unless it can be shown that there order to show cause. However, he did not
are "unusual circumstances." For exam- raise this argument at the second probation
ple, a prior adjudication is not a bar to revocation hearing or in his first habeas
reexamination of a conviction if there has petition before Judge Daniels. Candelario
been a retroactive change in the law, see first raised the issue of lack of notice in his
generally Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d petition before Judge Rokich. Prior adjudi81 (Utah 1983); a subsequent discovery cation of a habeas petition does not autoof suppressed evidence, see Gallegos v. matically bar the adjudication of a subseTurner, 17 Utah 2d 273, 409 P.2d 386 quent petition raising new grounds for re(1965), or newly discovered evidence, see lief. See Johns v. Shulsen, 784 P.2d 1151
State v. Lafferty, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah (Utah 1989) (per curiam); Hurst, 111 P2d
1989). But ordinarily, a ground for set- at 1037. However, rule 65B(iX4) requires
ting aside a conviction or sentence may that a petitioner show good cause for not
raising all complaints of denial of constitunot be relitigated.
Id. at 1036. The list of "unusual circum- tional rights in the first postconviction proconsideration of
stances" in Hurst is not exhaustive, but ceeding in order to justify
a subsequent petition.3 Candelario has
this case would not fall into any extension
shown no reason why he did not raise the
of that category. The double jeopardy
issue of lack of notice at the second revocaclaim presented to Judge Rokich in the rule
tion hearing or in his first habeas petition.

1. Rule 65B(iX2) provides in pertinent part:

with dismiss such complaint, giving written
(2) . . . The complaint shall further slate
notice thereof by mail to the complainant,
that the legality or constitutionality of his
and
no further proceedings shall be had on
commitment or confinement has not already
such complaint.
been adjudged in a prior habeas corpus or
Utah R.Civ.P. 65B0X2).
other similar proceeding; and if the complainant shall have instituted prior similar
2. Candelario would have been entitled to app^
proceedings in any court, state or federal,
late review of his double jeopardy claim »
within the state of Utah, he shall so state in
had appealed from Judge Daniels' order.
his complaint, shall attach a copy of any
pleading filed in such court by him to his
3. Rule 65B(i)(4) provides:
complaint, and shall set forth the reasons for
the denial of relief in such other court, in
(4) All claims of the denial of any oi c " ^
such case, if it is apparent to the court in
plainant's constitutional rights shall **!*lon
which the proceeding under this rule is insti
in the postconviction proceeding broug
tuied that the legality or constitutionality of
der thi* rule and may not be laised in *fw
his confinement has already been adjudged in
subsequent proceeding except for g**
shown therein.
such pi lor proceedings, the tourt shall forthUtah R.Civ.P. 65B(i)(4).
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and he has shown no good cause for relieving him of his waiver in this case.

Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part.

Judge Rokich's dismissal of the petition
jg affirmed.
HOWE, Associate C.J., and
ZIMMERMAN and STEWART, JJ.,
concur.
HALL, CJ., concurs in the results
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Margieann W. OSTLER (Wyatt), and
the State of Utah, Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
Raymond Floyd OSTLER, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 880172-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 20, 1990.

Former wife filed petition for modification of divorce decree. Parties stipulated
that there was a substantial change of circumstances sufficient to provide a basis for
modification of the decree. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, David S.
oung, Jt modified amount of support
rom
* 7 5 Per month per child to $200 per
month per child, declined to distribute former
husband's retirement account, but
awarded wife $250 in attorney fees. Wife
*>uKht review. The Court of Appeals,
^ n c h , J., held that: (1) trial court's failure
make specific findings on statutory
f
J ^ r s constituted reversible error, (2)
e ar
ticulated no change of circumstanc-

1. Divorce «=>309.1
Trial courts have continuing jurisdiction to make reasonable and necessary
changes in child support awards, taking
into account not only the needs of the chil
dren, but also the ability of the parent U
pay. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5(3).
2. Divorce <3=»309.2(2)
A party seeking modification of a chik
support award must show that a substantial change of circumstances has occurred
since the divorce decree, not contemplated
within the decree itself.
3. Divorce <S=»312.6<1)
Once the trial court has made a determination on modification of a child support
award, the Court of Appeals accords its
ruling substantial deference.
4. Divorce <s=»286(3, 6)
The apportionment of financial responsibility in a divorce proceeding will not be
upset on appeal unless the evidence clearly
preponderates to the contrary or the Court
of Appeals determines that the trial court
has abused its discretion.
5. Divorce ®^312.6(8)
The failure of trial court to enter specific findings on each of the statutory
factors for an award of prospective support
after a material change of circumstances is
generally reversible error, particularly
where the trial court orders a party to pay
support to a child beyond the age of majority. U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7(2) (now (3)).

6. Divorce «=>312.6(8)
Trial court's failure to make specific
findings as to each of the relevant statutory factors in proceeding to modify child
support, in which support was increased,
was reversible error, even though trial
p r o J U S t l f y i n g a r e e v a l u a t ' ° n of original
^ Petty division with regards to husband's court's findings noted a "dramatic" inU ^ t ™ 6 1 1 1 account; and (3) wife was enti- crease in husband's income and a "substanu> an award of attorney fees incurred tial" decline in wife's health. U.C.A.1953,
n a
Ppeal.
78-45-7(2) (now (3)).
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7. Divorce e=>286(6)
Trial court's finding, on former wife's
petition for modification of divorce decree,
that former husband's retirement account
was not vested at time of decree, and that
value of account at vesting was "sufficient
ly nominal" such that child support pay
ments made by husband in excess of legal
obligation more than compensated wife for
value of account, was appropriately described as a conclusion of law, and given no
particular deference on review, even
though trial court described its reasoning
as a "finding of f a c t "
8 Divorce <s=»254(2)
Former wife was not entitled to por
tion of former husband's retirement ac
count, on former wife's petition for modifi
cation of divorce decree, wife did not receive portion in initial decree, and wife's
claim of lack of knowledge of retirement
benefits did not constitute a change of cir
cumstances justifying reevaluation of ongi
nal division
9 Divorce «=>288
Former wife was entitled to award of
attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal of her petition for modification of di
vorce decree, where wife partially prevailed, and wife was in need of the assist
ance U C A 1953, 30-3-3
Penny Heal Trask, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs and appellants
Harold R Stephens, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent
Before DAVIDSON, BENCH and
BILLINGS, JJ
OPINION
BENCH, Judge
Appellant appeals from an order entered
in district court modifying a decree of di
vorce We affirm the order in part, vacate
the order m part and remand
Appellant Margieann Ostler and respon
tit nt Kivmond Hoyd Ostltr were divorced
ir l*r* i t u r tn e i g h t t e n y t a r marriage
Hit i k t r t t D1 divorce awarded appellant

child support in the amount of $75 per
month for each of the four children in her
custody The decree also provided for visi
tation rights, alimony, life and health msur
ance, attorney fees, and distribution of real
property, personal property, and debts
There was no provision for the distribution
of respondent's retirement account
In 1987, appellant filed a petition for
modification of the divorce decree Al
though respondent had voluntarily in
creased the amount of his child support
payments from $75 to $110 per month per
child, appellant sought to increase child
support to $230 per month for each of the
three remaining minor children She also
sought to distribute respondent's retirement account, and to receive her attorney
fees and costs As a basis for modification
of the decree, appellant stated that she was
unemployed, on public assistance, and that
she was unable to obtain employment due
to a speech disability She also alleged
that respondent had remarried and that his
income had increased substantially
Respondent moved to dismiss the petition
on the grounds that appellant had failed to
include the State of Utah as the real party
in interest Respondent claimed that the
State was providing appellant with finan
cial assistance and that the State was also
assigned appellant's right to receive child
support payments See Utah Code Ann
§ 78-45-9(2) (1987) The court subsequent
ly granted appellant's motion to amend her
petition to join the State of Utah as coplaintiff
A hearing on the petition was conducted
on December 16, 1987 Counsel for the
State appeared and stated that respondent
was current in his support obligation and
indicated that the State s interest was satis
fied as long as respondent continued u>
provide at least the existing level of ^upport Counsel was then excused
The parties stipulated that there was *
substantial change of circumstances suf >
cient to provide a basis for modification o
the decree
The hearing proceeded o\
proffer
The district court subsequent
issued a memorandum decision modify*11*

Cite as 789 P.24 713 (Utah App 1990)

the amount of support from $75 per month
per child to $200 per month per child It
remains unclear whether this award was
premised on the support of three children
or two children' The court declined to
distribute respondent's retirement account,
but awarded appellant $250 in attorney
fees Appellant now seeks review of the
amount of child support and the denial of
retirement benefits She also requests an
award of attorney fees on appeal
CHILD SUPPORT
[1-4] Trial courts have continuing juris
diction to make reasonable and necessary
changes in child support awards, taking
into account "not only the needs of the
children, but also the ability of the parent
to pay" Woodward v Woodward, 709
P2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) (per curiam),
Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5(3) (1989) A par
ty seeking modification of a child support
award must show that a substantial change
of circumstances has occurred since the
divorce decree, not contemplated within the
decree itself Woodward, 709 P 2d at 394
Once the trial court has made a determina
tion on modification, we accord its ruling
substantial deference
Id,
Proctor v
Proctor, 773 P 2d 1389, 1390 (Utah Ct App
1989) The apportionment of financial re
sponsibility between the parties will not be
upset on appeal unless the evidence clearly
preponderates to the contrary or we deter
mine that the court has abused its discre
ton
Woodward, 709 P 2d at 394, Chris
tensen v Chnstensen, 628 P 2d 1297, 1299
Wtah 1981), Proctor, 773 P 2d at 390,
Maughan v Maughan, 770 P2d 156, 161
(Utah Ct App 1989) However, an award of
child support may be "so inordinately low"
48
to constitute an abuse of discretion
Martinez v Martinez, 754 P 2d 69, 73
<Utah Ct App 1988), cert granted, 765 P 2d
l2
?7 (1988)
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modifying the original support award from
$75 to $200 per month per child
151 In awarding prospective support af
ter a material change of circumstances, the
relevant factors to be considered include
(a) the standard of living and situation of
the parties,
(b) the relative wealth and income of the
parties,
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn,
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn,
(e) the need of the obligee,
(0 the age of the parties,
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for
the support of others
Utah Code Ann § 78-45-7(2) (1987), Mar
tinez, 754 P 2d at 73 n 3 Because these
factors "constitute material issues upon
which the trial court must enter findings of
fact," Jeffeneb v Jeffenes, 752 P 2d 909,
911 (Utah Ct App 1988), the failure to enter
specific findings on each of the factors is
generally reversible error, particularly
where the court orders a party to pay support to a child beyond the age of majority
Id at 911-12
[6] While the trial court made findings
of fact, we cannot determine to what ex
tent these factors were applied The find
mgs merely note a * dramatic' increase in
respondent's income and a "substantial"
decline in appellant s health, and set the
award at $200 per month per child The
lack of specificity in the findings is further
compounded by the court s award of support until each child graduates from high
school' regardless of age We conclude
that the failure of the trial court to make
specific findings on the statutory factors
constitutes reversible error

*he parties in this case stipulated that
there had been a substantial change of
lr
<-umstances since the original decree
e
stipulation leaves for resolution wheth
r
the district court abused its discretion in

Since the case must be remanded for
entry of more specific findings, we merely
note the apparent inadequacy in the
amount of child support awarded Statu
tory guidelines now establish base amounts
of child support
See Utah Code Ann
§ 78-45-7 14 (Supp 1989) Although not in
effect at the time of the trial court's modi
fication order
see Utah Code Ann

ne of the three minors was nearly eighteen
'he imit of ihe modilnation lieaung theie

fore only iwo children of the marriage are now
below the age o( majority

1
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§ 78-45-7 2(lMa) (Supp 1989), these guide
lines are useful in determining the adequa
cy of support Appellant argues that the
disparity between the statutory guidelines
and the trial courts award constitutes an
abuse of discretion We are not prepared
to go quite so far in the absence of specific
findings, but the financial declarations of
appellant and respondent contained in the
record indicate gross monthly incomes of
$828 and $4,372, respectively
Cf Mar
tinez, 764 P 2d at 73 (abuse of discretion
shown in award of $300 per month per
child, where incomes were $1,033 and
$8,333, respectively)
Appellant is functionally handicapped, on welfare, and receiving food stamps These facts connote
such a sharp contrast in living standards
between the parties that $200 per month
per child appears to be inadequate, and
thus may constitute an abuse of the court's
discretion
"Child support awards should approxi
mate actual need and, when possible, as
sure the children a standard of hvmg com
parable to that which they would have ex
penenced if no divorce had occurred " Pe
terson v Peterson, 748 P 2d 593, 596 (Utah
Ct App 1988)
Furthermore, it is public
policy m this state that "children shall be
maintained from the resources of respon
sible parents, thereby relieving or avoiding,
at least in part, the burden often borne by
the general citizenry through welfare programs " Utah Code Ann § 78-45b-l 1
(1987) Since we must vacate the order
and remand for entry of more specific find
ings, the award of support should either be
justified under these objectives, or modified
consistent with the statutory guidelines
now m effect 2
RETIREMENT ACCOUNT
DISTRIBUTION
As part of appellant's petition for modifi
cation, she claimed that respondent's retirement account was undistributed at the time
of the divorce and should now be so distributed Appellant concedes that the decree
2

The statutory guidelines may be applied to
child suppoit orders existing prior (o July 1
WiW «s i< nju, us the guidelines do not form the

makes no mention of the retirement ac
count, but argues that she was not aware
of it at the time of the divorce The dis
tnct court refused to modify the divorce
decree to distribute the retirement account
on the grounds that it was not vested at
the time of the decree The court also
found that the value of the account at
vesting was "sufficiently nominal" such
that child support payments made by respondent in excess of his legal obligation
more than compensated appellant for the
value of the account
[7] Although the trial court described
its reasoning as a "finding of fact,' it is
more appropriately described as a conclu
sion of law See State ex rel Dxv of
Consumer Protection v Rio Vista Oil,
Ltd, 786 P2d 1343, 1346 (Utah 1990) (Api
pellate court will disregard the label of
"findings of fact" and look to the substance) We accord a trial court's legal
conclusions no particular deference on appeal, but review them for correctness
IFG Leasing Co v Gordon, 776 P 2d 607
611 (Utah 1989) Without addressing the
correctness of the district court's rationale
we may still affirm the result "on any
proper ground(s), despite the trial court's
having assigned another reason for its rul
mg " Buehner Block Co v UWC Assocs
752 P2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988)
[8] Shortly after the district court ren
dered its decision, this court addressed a
similar issue in Throckmorton v Throck
morton, 767 P 2d 121 (Utah Ct App WW
Mrs Throckmorton sought to modify a
1976 divorce decree, silent as to Mr
Throckmorton's retirement benefits, to obtain one-half of those benefits The trial
court determined that Mrs Throckmorton
had the opportunity to litigate the issue at
the time of the divorce, and since she failed
to do so, the claim was barred under the
doctrine of res judicata
Our opinion noted that res judicata »s
unique in divorce actions because of the
equitable doctrine which allows courts to
basis of a material change ot circumstance
Utah Code Ann § 78-45 7 2(l)(b) (Supp I 9 8 9 '

the attorney fees of the party in need
reopen alimony, support, or property distn
This discretionary authority has been held
butions if the moving party can demon
to include attorney fees incurred on appeal
strate a substantial change of circumstanc
See Maughan, 770 P 2d at 162-63 Based
es since the matter was previously con
Id at 123 We on appellant s financial declaration, it is
3idered by the court"
apparent that she is in need of such assist
noted that pension benefit** were first rec
ance bmce appellant has partially preognized as marital assets in Utah in Wood
ward v Woodward, 656 P 2d 431 (Utah vailed, we award her attorney fees reason
1982) {"Woodward /")
Throckmorton, ably incurred on appeal
767 P 2d at 123 We then addressed the
!ssue whether Woodward I should be given
CONCLUSION
retroactive effect Id We ultimately de
We affirm the district court's order with
termmed that ' legal recognition of a new respect to respondent's retirement account
category of property rights after a divorce The remainder of the order is vacated
decree has been entered, is not itself suffi
The issue of child support is remanded for
cient to establish a substantial change of the entry of specific findings and an award
circumstances justifying a reevaluation of of child support in accordance with those
the prior property division" Id at 124
findings We also remand the case for the
In the instant case, appellant has articu
purpose of determining and awarding at
lated no change of circumstance justifying torney fees and costs reasonably incurred
a reevaluation of the original property divi
by appellant on appeal
sion Appellant's claim of lack of knowl
DAVIDSON and BILLINGS, JJ ,
edge of the retirement benefits does not
constitute such a change The only other concur
possible change of circumstance is Wood
ward i's legal recognition of retirement
KirNUMMHSYSU
benefits as marital assets However, the
decree of divorce was entered more than
four years before the issuance of Wood
ward I and the modification order was en
Lauralee CURTIS. Plaintiff
tered a year before the issuance of Throck
and Appellant,
morton
Inasmuch as Woodward / is to
v
be given prospective application only, there
William
Gregory
CURTIS,
Defendant
»s no appropriate basis on which to divide
and Respondent
respondent's retirement account Rather,
we find the "policy interest favoring the
No 890210-CA
finality of property settlements to be com
Court of Appeals of Utah
pelhng Throckmorton, 767 P 2d at 124
(quoting Guffey v LaChance, 127 Ariz
March 27, 1990
140, 618 P 2d 634, 636 (Ct App 1980)), see
also Porco v Porco, 752 P 2d 365, 368
Former wife challenged former hus
(Utah Ct App 1988) We therefore affirm
band s failure to return children to Utah
the district court's order with respect to
from Mississippi Former husband moved
retirement benefits
for enforcement of Mississippi court's mod
tftcation of child custody provisions of Utah
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
divorce decree The Fourth District Court,
Utah County Boyd L Park J , enforced
191 Appellant contends she is impecuni
ou
Mississippi court's modification of custody
s and requests attorney fees on appeal
A
The Court of Appeals,
though she does not cite statute or rule Wife appealed
for
Orme J , held that (1) Mississippi court
such an award Utah (ode Ann
& *0-3-d (1989) provides that either party lacked jurisdiction to modify child custody
10
«* divorce action may be ordered to pay while Utah court had continuing junsdic

V
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$28,150 from the retirement fund to pay Absent some clear abuse of discretion, the
various debts, leaving approximately $8,736 trial court's distribution of marital assets
in the fund. Trial was held May 18, 1987. and liabilities will not be disturbed. Id.
Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the
[1] Subsequent to issuance of the trial
court interviewed Aaron and Mario to aid
in its CMtody determination. A second in- court's restraining order, James withdrew
terview was conducted the following day at $28,150 from the retirement fund to pay
for the following: $15,460.27 business loan
Barbara's request
from Zions First National Bank, $3,085.08
In its findings, conclusions, and decree, pay advance and $1,622.48 loan from Paintthe court awarded custody of Benjamin and er Motor, $1,589.87 loan from First SecuriMeLea to Barbara. The court awarded the ty Bank, $2,456.28 for two motorcycles,
parties joint custody of Aaron and Mario
and $3,936.10 in taxes. The trial court
wherein their principal place of residence
ruled that except for the tax payment, the
would be with Barbara, but both children
would live six months of the year with each withdrawals were in violation of its reparty as long as both parties remained in straining order. The court credited BarNephi, Utah. If either party moves, Bar- bara with half the sum that should have
bara would have custody subject to remained in the fund. James contends the
James's reasonable visitation rights. The loans he paid were marital liabilities subcourt ordered James to pay $450 in alimo- ject to equitable division. However, he
ny, $160 per child in child support (except failed to present any documentation or othfor the time while Aaron and Mario are er evidence to characterize the loans as
living with him), and Barbara's attorney subjecting Barbara to any liability. We
fees. In its property distribution, the court find no abuse of the trial court's discretion.
held James violated the restraining order
[23 James argues the court erred in not
by paying off personal debts with the re- clearly specifying the family partnership
tirement fund. The court ruled that $32,- interest and company stock were his sepa950 ($36,886 less $3,936 paid in taxes) rate property. In Burke v. Burke, 733
' should have remained in the fund, one-half
P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987), the Utah Suof which was credited to Barbara. Based
preme Court held, "Premarital property,
on this premise, the court awarded Barbara
exclusive possession of and one-half equity gifts, and inheritances may be viewed as
in the home, the $7,000 lot, the remaining separate property, and in appropriate cir$8,736 in the retirement fund, the car with cumstances, equity will require that each
clear title provided by James, and one-half party retain the separate property brought
of the proceeds from a sale of the $6,000 to the marriage." The trial court awarded
lot James received one-half equity in the James his partnership interest and stock.
home, the partnership interest, the stock, Furthermore, after removing these two asand one-half of the proceeds from the sets from the marital estate, the trial
$6,000 lot The court also ordered James court's distribution remains equitable.
to pay aU obligations incurred during the James's contention is therefore without
marriage except the mortgage on the merit We also find no merit to James's
home, liability for which was assigned to contention regarding his responsibility to
secure clear title to the car for Barbara.
Barbara.
The property distribution is affirmed.
On appeal, James first argues the trial
[3,4] James next argues the trial
court erred in not equitably dividing between the parties the obligations he paid court's conduct in interviewing the two oldout of the retirement fund. "In adjusting er children a second time without giving
the financial interests of parties to a di- him notice violated his constitutional rights
vorce, the trial court is permitted consider- to due process and equal protection. We
able discretion and its actions are entitled find no merit to James's constitutional chalto a presumption of validity." Cook v. lenge to the second interview of Aaron and
Cook, 739 P.2d 90, 93 (Utah App.1987). Mario. Even if James were notified of the

interview, he was not entitled to be
present
Furthermore, in ruling on
James's objections to the findings of fact
and conclusions of law, the trial court stated the second interview was held simply to
inform the two children of the joint custody
decision. The failure to give James notice
of the second interview was, at most, harmless error. Utah R.Civ.P. 61.
James also contends the court's findings
are insufficient to support the custody
award. A trial court is afforded the same
broad discretion in making custody awards
as it is in distributing marital property.
However, to ensure the court acted within
its broad discretion, the facts and reasons
for the court's decision must be set forth
fully in appropriate findings and conclusions. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah
1988); Marekant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d
199 (Utah App.1987). "Proper findings of
fact ensure that the ultimate custody
award follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence and the controlling
legal principles." Smith v. Smith, 726
P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). Although in
equity matters this Court may review the
evidence and make its own findings, that
"cannot serve as an excuse for the failure
below to furnish adequate findings to ensure that the trial court's discretionary determination was rationally based." Martinez v. Martinet, 728 P.2d 994 (Utah
1986). See Acton v. Zk/trtw, 737 P.2d 996,
999 (Utah 1987); Marchant, 743 P.2d at
203 (trial court's failure to make proper
findings is harmless error only if facts
clearly support only a finding in favor of
custody award).

of the child cannot pass muster when the
custody award is challenged and an
abuse of the trial court's discretion is
urged on appeal.
728 P.2d at 995 (quoted in Ebbert v. Efh
bert, 744 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah App.1987)).
The findings of the trial court in the instant
case are inadequate to support the custody
award. Although no one set of factors
governs a custody determination in every
case, the trial court's findings should articulate those factors pertinent to the child's
best interests which the court considered in
making its determination, such as the
needs of the child and the ability of each
parent to meet those needs. Sanderson v.
Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987); Marchant, 743 P.2d at 208.
The decree of divorce is affirmed except
for the custody award which is remanded
for additional findings.

[51 In the instant case, the trial court
awarded Barbara sole custody of Benjamin
and MeLea and joint custody of Aaron and
Mario. In its findings, the court simply
found "[Barbara] is a fit and proper person
to have the care, custody, and control of
the minor children, Melea [sic] and Benjamin." This Court has previously recognised the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in
Martinez wherein the Court held:
A mere finding that the parties are or
are not "fit and proper persons to be
awarded the care, custody, and control"

Court of Appeals of Utah.

DAVIDSON and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.
(p fxcrNUMitfsnttM}

Bra Louise JEFFERIES, Ptofcilff
and Respondent,
v.
DOMM Lloyd JEFFERIES, Dafaata*
and Appellant
No. 870228-CA.
April 13, 1988.
In divorce proceeding, the District
Court, Sanpete Court, Don V. Tibbs, J.,
awarded contract receivable on motel
owned by husband and wife as child support to their adult handicapped daughter,
and husband appealed. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that (1) where
court orders party to pay child support to
child who has reached age of majority but
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is nevertheless entitled to support under under control of wife for sole benefit of
statute requiring parent to support incapac- child.
itated child of whatever age, court must
enter specific findings of fact on each of
Noall T. Wootton (argued), American
factors set forth in statute for determining
amount of child support, and (2) court im- Fork, for defendant and appellant
Richard B. Johnson (argued), Orem, for
properly awarded contract to parties' incapacitated adult child, where contract was plaintiff and respondent
for purpose of creating estate for child's
Before BENCH, DAVIDSON and
permanent benefit and maintenance.
GREENWOOD,
JJ.
Reversed and remanded.
OPINION
1. Appeal and Error *»1008.1(5)
GREENWOOD, Judge:
When examining court's findings of
Defendant, Donald Lloyd Jefferies, apfact, reviewing court defers to those findpeals from a divorce decree which awarded
ings unless they are clearly erroneous.
a contract, owned by defendant and plain2. Parent and Child *=»3.3(6, 7)
When determining amount of child tiff, Eva Louise Jefferies, to their adult
support, court must consider seven factors handicapped daughter. Defendant seeks
listed in statute for determining child sup- reversal of the trial court's findings and
port, and court must enter findings of fact remand for further findings. We reverse
and remand.
on those factors. U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7.
Plaintiff and defendant were divorced
3. Divorce *»307
following forty-four years of marriage.
Where court, in divorce proceeding, or- During the marriage, the parties had four
ders parent to pay child support for child children. At the time of the divorce, all of
who has reached age of majority but is the children were adults, but one child,
nevertheless entitled to support under stat- Joycelyn, was thirty-seven, had a mental
ute requiring parent to support incapacitat- age of approximately thirteen and was deed child of whatever age, court must enter pendent upon plaintiff for support
specific findings of fact on each of factors
The trial court found plaintiffs earning
set forth in statute for determining amount
ability
was $136 per month from social
of child support U.C.A.1953, 78-45-2, 78security and defendant's earning capacity
45-7.
was $436 per month from social security
4. Divorce «»307
and $300 per month from part-time work.
Court's findings of fact in divorce pro- The trial court also found that if it did not
ceeding regarding child support order for make provision for support of Joycelyn, she
adult incapacitated child were insufficient, would become a ward of the state. The
where court failed to enter findings on all court then divided the parties' marital asfactors contained in statute for determin- sets, including contracts receivable on proping amount of support U.C.A.1953, 78- erties the parties sold during the marriage,
and awarded one contract receivable, on
45-7.
the El Rancho Motel in Provo, Utah, to
5. Divorce *»3Q8
Court improperly awarded husband's Joycelyn. The contract receivable on the
and wife's contract receivable on motel to El Rancho Motel provided for payments
their incapacitated adult child in divorce over the next 28.9 years, with a principal
proceeding, where award of contract was balance of $178,655 plus interest of 8.5%
for purpose of creating estate for child's and monthly payments of $1,385. A conpermanent benefit and maintenance; court tract payable by the parties on the same
could have awarded support equal to net property had a $17,846 principal balance
contract proceeds and had those proceeds payable at $500 per month for approxi-

a t e mm 752 TJtA m
1 (Utak App. 1*88)

mately 5.25 years. The court ordered that
the net proceeds of the two contracts be
placed in an account for Joycelyn's use
with plaintiff as custodian of the monies
and the use thereof. The court also ordered defendant to pay $1 per month support for Joycelyn.
Defendant claims that the amount of
child support was arbitrarily determined
without consideration of the factors set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 (1987)
and that the court erred in awarding the
contract receivable to Joycelyn.

^Utah 911

(a) the standard of living and situation of
the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the
parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(f) the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for
the support of others.
Because those factors involve questions of
fact, we examine the trial court's findings
of fact and defer to those findings unless
I
We first examine whether the trial they are clearly erroneous. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). It is
court's child support award was arbitrarily
well-established that "[f)ailure of the trial
determined without proper consideration of
court to make findings on all material isthe factors set forth in section 78-45-7.
sues is reversible error unless the facts in
The financial obligation of a parent to an
the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and
incapacitated adult child is contained in seccapable of supporting only a finding in
tion 78-45-1 through 13 (1987), the Utah
favor of the judgment'" Acton v. J.B.
Uniform Civil liability for Support Act Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)
Sections 3 and 4 state that every man and (quoting Kinkella v. BaugK 660 P.2d 233,
every woman is required to support his or 236 (Utah 1983)). In addition, "[t]he findher child. "Child" includes "a son or a ings 'should be sufficiently detailed and
daughter of whatever age who is incapaci- include enough subsidiary facts to disclose
tated from earning a living and without the steps by which the ultimate conclusion
sufficient means." Section 78-46-2(4). on each factual issue was reached.'" Id.
The trial court found that
(quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336,
the parties have a child, Joycelyn Jeffer- 1338 (Utah 1979)).
ies, who was born on December 5, 1949,
[2-4] Section 78-45-7 requires the trial
who has a mental age of approximately
13 years. The Court finds the parties court to consider at least the seven factors
have always been responsible for the listed therein. Further, those factors conchild and that the Court must consider stitute material issues upon which the trial
those factors in deciding this case. Spe- court must enter findings of fact In this
cifically, the Court finds that if the Court case, however, the trial court failed to endoes not make provision for support of ter findings on all of the factors. Further,
this individual, that individual shall be- the facts in the record are not so clear and
come award [sic] of the State of Utah. uncontroverted as to support the amount of
[1] Defendant does not dispute his re- child support awarded to Joycelyn. For
sponsibility to provide support for Joycelyn example, the only evidence in the record
regarding Joycelyn's financial needs is
so long as she is in need, nor the fact that
plaintiffs financial declaration, but that
she has limited capacity. Defendant does,
declaration does not separate plaintiffs
however, contend that the court should and Joycelyn'sfinancialneeds. Therefore,
have, but did not, consider all of the factors we conclude that the trial court's findings
set forth in section 78-46-7. Section 78- of fact are insufficient We specifically
45-7 states:
hold that where the court orders a party to
the court, in determining the amount of pay child support to a child who has
prospective support, shall consider all rel- reached the age of majority but is neverevant factors including but not limited to: theless entitled to support under section
752PJM-21
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-2, the court must enter specific findof fact on each of the factors set forth
f section 78-46-7. Our holding should not
interpreted to mean that the trial court's
Incision as to the amount of child support
§ incorrect, but only that the court's findigs of fact are insufficient to allow appei
|te review of the amount awarded.
I
i
II
We next address whether the trial .v-u-t
|pred in awarding the parties' contrai r-kivable to their adult child. In Eftglun v
\tglisK 565 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah Wil,
fce Utah Supreme Court stated:
A court may not, under a decree of divorce, attempt to transfer any property
of either parent to the children, for the
purpose of creating an estate for their
^permanent benefit Furthermore, the
court may not make provision out of the
property of either of the parties for the
maintenance of children who are of age,
and who are not physically incapacitated.
[5] In this case, the court awarded the
urties' personal property, the contract reivable on the El Rancho Motel, to Joycen. The property was clearly intended te
ovide an estate for Joycelyn's permanent
nefit Joycelyn would receive income of
86 per month for the first 5.26 years of
e contract, and, after payout of the unrlying obligation, $1,385 per month for
out 23 years after that The contract
mid provide financial resources for Joy
tyn at least until she reached the age of
, unless she sold or otherwise disposed of
is asset Accordingly, the court's award
the contract receivable to Joycelyn is
titrary to the rule as stated in English.
erefore, we hold that the trial court
*ed in awarding the parties' contract revable to their mentally handicapped

that the net proceeds from the £1 Rancho
Motel contract would be an appropriate
source for those support payments. This
end could be met, after making necessary
findings of fact, by awarding support equal
to the net contract proceeds and having
those proceeds under the control of plaintiff for the sole benefit of Joycelyn.

In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P 2d 1218, 1222
Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court restated
his portion of English in dicta. Because that

restatement appears to be inaccurate and because it is dicta, we do not rely on me restatement in this opinion.

Reversed and remanded for proceedings
m accordance with this opinion.
BENCH and DAVIDSON, JJ.
concur.

••STJTtl-

AMERICAN ROOFING COMPANY
and/or Employers Mutual
Liability, Plaintiffs,
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, George Roy Green, and
die Second Injury Fund, Defendants.
No. 87018S-CA.
Court of Appeals of Uuh
April 13, 1988.

Employer and insurer petitioned tor
review of Industrial Commission order
awarding workers' compensation benefits.
The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that
I) evidence supported Commission's findlighter.
ing of compensable injury, and (2) claimant
was entitled to average weekly wage based
We note, however, that this Court has no on a minimum of 20 hours per week, even
jection to or quarrel with the trial court's though claimant only worked 13 hours per
parent notion that support payments t>_ week.
fendant for Joycelyn should be from a
Affirmed in part and remanoea m part
irce other than defendant's income and

1. Workers' Compensation *=>1533
Substantial evidence supported administrative law judge's finding that workers'
compensation claimant's on the job injury
was "by accident"; although claimant had
previously experienced pain in lower back
and legs when injured while working for
other employers, he was able to return to
work after a period of rest and when lifting
bucket of debris for last employer, he suffered injury which rendered him totally and
permanently disabled, unable to return to
work. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
2. Workers' Compensation *»697, 1417
Element of causation, a prerequisite
forfindinginjury compensable under workers' compensation law, requires proof of
both legal cause and medical cause. U.C.
A.1963, 35-1-45.
3. Workers' Compensation *»U90
Industrial Commission's finding that
evidence of weight of bucket, together with
manner in which workers' compensation
claimant lifted bucket and fact that bucket
snagged, combined to characterize claimant's action as unusual or extraordinary so
as to show legal causation, for workers'
compensation purposes, was not arbitrary
or capricious. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
4. Workers' Compensation *»821
Workers' compensation claimant was
entitled to compensation based on average
weekly wage based on a minimum of 20
hours per week, even though claimant only
worked 13 hours per week. U.C.A.1963,
35-1-67, 35-1-75, 35-l-75(lXe), UXgXiii).

OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
American Roofing Company (American
Roofing) and its insurance carrier Employer's Mutual liability petition this Court for
review of an order of the Industrial Commission (Commission) awarding workers'
compensation benefits to an injured employee.
In February 1956, George Green, an employee of J.E. Steel Company (J.E.), injures
his lower back in an industrial accident
He received medical treatment and, between 1956 and 1983, visited two chiropractors for occasional treatments. In February 1983, Green, while still employed by
J.E., now known as Paulsen Steel Company
(Paulsen), fell on a ladder and again injured
his lower back. Following this injury,
Green began experiencing severe stabbing
pains beginning in his lower back and moving down his legs. Green would typically
treat his pain with a hot bath and rest In
the summer of 1983, Green left Paulsen
and was hired by American Roofing.
Green's pains increased in May 1985, and
he consulted Dr. Henrie, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Henrie diagnosed a degenerative spinal condition and scheduled a CAT
scan and lumbar myelogram for September
25, 1985.

On September 6, while still in the employ
of American Roofing, Green attempted to
unload a thirty pound bucket of debris out
of his truck. As he leaned over the bed
and lifted the bucket, the bucket snagged
on something and Green suffered a much
Michael E. Dyer (argued), Stephanie A. more severe "lightning bolt" of pain in his
Mallory, Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, back and legs. After several minutes,
Green was able to get into his car and
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.
Erie V. Boorman, Adm'r, Second Injury return home. He never returned to work
Fund, Barbara Elicerio, Legal Counsel, In- again. The CAT scan and myelogram were
dus. Com'n, William W. Downes, Jr. (ar- performed as scheduled as well as a chemogued), Salt Lake City, for respondent nucleolysis in November 1985. Green was
diagnosed as suffering from disc herniaGreen.
tion.
Elliot Morris, Workers CompensatR*.
Green filed applications for a hearing
Fund of Utah, Salt Lake City.
seeking disability benefits from the 1988
Before BENCH, GARFF and ORME,
and 1985 accidents. After a hearing on
JJ.
May 1, 1986, the Administrative Law Judge

A **£S

=*i Sv^iems v. ..
140 Uua AUY.tap.41

Subject matter jurisdiction is the
power and authority of the court to
determine a controversy and
without which it cannot proceed,
Without jurisdiction over the
subject matter alleged in plaintiffs
claims, the court was without authority to proceed or to enter any
adjudication on the merits of the
claims.
... The jurisdictional limits of u
statutorily created court, such as the
circuit court, are circumscribed by
its empowering legislation. A circuit
court cannot expand its jurisdiction
to adjudicate claims which are in
excess of $10,000 or which involved
he title to real property. Unlike a
court's exercise of jurisdiction over
a person or party, subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be created or
conferred on the court by consent
or waiver,
(citations omitted.) This court further noted
that the trial court was under an obligation,
even absent an objection, to determine its
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claims asserted. Id. Having determined that
the matter was outside its jurisdiction, the trial
court could proceed only by dismissal. Transworld seeks to distinguish Thompson on the
basis that that case concerned the $10,000
jurisdictional limit and the limitation regarding
real property matters. The distinction is
without merit because the same principles
apply equally to the exception to jurisdiction
.nvolved in this case. "Since the entire proceedings before the circuit court were conducted
absent jurisdiction, they are a nullity and are
void." hi The appeal is dismissed, and this
case is remanded to the circuit court with
instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
ALL CONCUR:
Pamela T. Green wooa. Judge
Russei W Bench Judge
Richtr
a i_4in, Judge
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Marilyn J. DURFEE (Wolf)*
PUuatiff mad Appellee,
•.

Fraak W. DURFEE,
No. SK221-CA
FILED: A«g«* '» ***>
Third District, Tooele Count
Honorable Pat B. Brian
ATTORNEYS:
J. Franklin Allred, Salt Lp*e ^u> for
Appellant
Ephraim H. Fankhauser, baa Lake City, for
Appellee
Before Judges Davidson, Bench. *nd Orme.
OPINION

BENCH, Judge:
Appellant appeals from a final order of tne
trial court which modified a divorce decree by
increasing child support payments and denied
appellant's counterpetition for modification.
We affirm in part, but vacate the support
award and remand the case for further proceedings and entry of additional findings.
Appellant Frank Durfee and appellee
Marilyn Durfee were divorced in 1978. Appellee received custody of their two children
then aged two and six. Appellant was requirec
to pay $150 per child per month as child
support.
In 1988, appellee filed a petition to amenc
the decree of divorce and asked that chile
support be increased to a minimum of $300
per child per month. The suggested basis for
the increase was that expenses for the two
children had increased and that appellant's
income had increased substantially since the
original divorce decree was entered in 1978
Appellee also sought reimbursement for half
of the medical, dental, and optical expenses
incurred by the minor children which were not
paid by insurance.
Appellant filed a counterpetition asking, in
relevant part, that his obligation to pay
support for the older son be terminated
because the child lives with his maternal grandmother during the school year. Appellant
also asked that appellee be required to execute
the appropriate forms to allow appellant to
claim the two children as exemptions on his
state and federal income tax returns.
After a trial was held on January 13, 1989.
the trial court entered an order on February
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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27, 1989 which increased child support to $323 divorce decree required father to pay suppleper month for the younger child, then age 12, mental child support payments equal to one
and $375 per month for the older child, then half of his increase in income over a set
age 16. The trial court calculated these amount); see aiso Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d
amounts based solely on the Uniform Child 726, 729 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (there was no
Support Guidelines, Utah Code of Judicial substantial change in circumstances where the
Admin., Appendix H, (1988) (hereinafter trial court reasonably anticipated that plaintiff
referred to as the "1988 Guidelines").* The would increase her earnings by a specific
court also required each party to assume and amount). Since the divorce decree at issue did
pay half of the children's unpaid medical, not have a provision expressly anticipating an
hospital, dental, orthodontic, and optical j increase in appellant's income, and since
expenses not paid by insurance. Furthermore, j appellant did not offer any evidence at trial
the trial court denied appellant's counterpet- that the trial court had previously anticipated
the increase in income when the original
ition.
divorce decree was entered, we find that the
MATERIAL CHANGE IN
I increase was not a material change in circuCIRCUMSTANCES
mstances contemplated in the original divorce
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in decree.
finding a material change of circumstances due
Since the substantial increase in appellant's
to an increase in appellant's gross tncome and j
an increase in the cost of providing for the I income constitutes a material change of circumstances sufficient to provide a basis for
children as they grow older.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 I modification of the decree, see, e.g., Maughan
(1989), the trial court has continuing junsdi- j v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App.
ction to modify child support obligations. "On I 1989), we need not address the issue of
a petition for a modification of a divorce whether ihe aging of a child may also constidecree, the threshold requirement for relief is tute a material change of circumstances.
a showing of a substantial change of circumCHILD SUPPORT
stances occurring since the entry of the decree
Appellant next argues that the trial court
and not contemplated in the decree itself." Stet- erred in its determination of child support by
tier v. Stettlcr, 713 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah applying the 1988 Guidelines without exami1985).
ning the actual expenses attributable to *thc
The trial court found that appellant's gross children, and by not considering appellant's
income increased from approximately $29,000 ability to provide support.
per year in 1978 to approximately $45,000 per
"The [trial court's} apportionment of finayear in 1988 for an increase of approximately ncial responsibility between the parties will not
$16,000. Appellant contends that the trial be upset on appeal unless the evidence clearly
court erred in determining his 1978 and 1988 preponderates to the contrary or we determine
salaries and that the actual increase was only 1 that the court has abused its discretion. * Ostler
approximately $9,000. The court's findings on v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah Ct.
this issue, however, arc not clearly erroneous. App. 1990) (citations omitted). We find that,
See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Grayson Roper the trial court abused its discretion in failing
Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, to enter sufficient findings of fact to support
470 (Utah 1989). In any event, the disparity the child support ordered.
was harmless since even the substantial incrThe "Overview" section of the 1988 Guideease proposed by appellant would have suff- lines clearly indicated that the guidelines were
iced to establish a material change of circum- only advisory to the court. Section I, paragstances.
raph 1, stated that "{flinal orders in all case&
Appellant contends that "it could not reas- shall be made at the discretion of the court
onably be argued [that] such a modest increase based upon the facts of the individual case."
in salary was not contemplated by the parties At the time of these proceedings, Utah Code
at the time of the entry of decree of divorce. * Ann. §78-45-7(2) (1987)* provided that
The fact that the parties may have anticipated i
(2) When ... a material change in
an increase of income in their own minds or in
circumstances has occurred, the
their discussions does not mean that the decree j
court, in determining the amount of
itself contemplates the change. In order for a j
prospective support, shall consider
material change in circumstances to be conte- I
all relevant factors including bui
mplated in a divorce decree there must be
not limited to:
evidence, preferably in the form of a provision
a)
the standard of living and situa
within the decree itself, that the trial court
tion of the parties;
anticipated the specific change. See Christe- j
b) the relative wealth and income o.
nsen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297, 1300 j
the parties;
(Utah 1981) (substantial, unexpected increase
c) the ability of the obligor to e«irn.
in father's income did not constitute a subst- |
d) the ability of the ooligec ;o cam
antial change in circumstances when original
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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ther. See In re Olscn, 111 Utah 365, 180 P.2a
e) the need of the obligee,
210, 213-14 (1947) (*The fact that the mat
0 the age of the parties;
ernal grandparents honored the request of the
g) the responsibility of the obligor
dying mother to look after the children certfor the support of others.
These factors 'constitute matermi issues ainly did not absolve the father of the duty to
upon which the trial court must en;er findings furnish them necessaries.").
Although the child's extended absence from
of fact.* Jeffcrics v. Jcffencs, 752 P.2d 909,
the appellee does not excuse appellant from
911 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).
his legal duty to provide support, we agree
It is well-established thai *if}aiiure
with appellant that the child support he proof the trial court to make findings
vides must be applied to the child's care. We
on all material issues is reversible
disagree with appellant, however, that such
error unless the facts in the record
support payments must, as a rule, be delivered
are 'clear, uncontroverted, and
directly to the third party providing the care.
capable of supporting only a
The means by which child support payment >
finding in favor of the judgment.'*
are made is to be designed by the trial court.
Acton v. J.B. Deliran. 737 P.2d
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(1) (1989). *Thc
996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella
trial court may fashion such equitable order
v. Baugh,
660 P.2d 233,
in relation to the children and their support as
236 (Utah 1983). IThese findings)
is reasonable and necessary ....* Woodward v.
•should be sufficiently detailed and
Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985).
include enough subsidiary facts to
Typically, child support payments are made to
disclose the steps by which the ultthe custodial parent because the custodial
imate conclusion on each factual
parent, by reason of physical custody, incurs
issue was reached.* (quoting Rocker
the expenses of caring for the child. A trial
v. Da/ton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338
court may, however, determine that it is in the
(Utah 1979).
best interest of the child to have support
Jeffries, 752 P.2d at 911.
payments made directly to a third-party care
In this case, the trial court's findings are provider during the child's extended absence.
"clearly inadequate to demonstrate that the A trial court may, on the other hand, decline
trial court considered the relevant factors in to order payments directly to the third party if
determining [the) child support awards. Det- it concludes that the support paid to the cusailed findings of fact and conclusions of law todial parent will likely be applied to the care
are necessary for this reviewing court to ensure of the child during the extended absence. A
that the trial court's discretionary determina- trial court therefore has discretion to make
tion of the ... child support awards was rati- such arrangements as may be required by the
onally based.* Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d circumstances of a given case to ensure that a
952, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). We further child receives the support ordered.
find that the facts in the record are not clear
Testimony at trial indicated that appellee
and uncontroverted in support of the amount forwarded the child support payments to the
of the child support awarded, which was based grandmother for the benefit of the child while
solely on the advisory amounts provided by the child was living with the grandmother.
the 1988 Guidelines. We therefore reverse the Since the evidence was clear and uncontrovetrial court's order increasing the amount of rted that prior support payments had been
child support.
applied to the support of the child, and since
there was no indication that the payments
EXTENDED ABSENCE OF CHILD
Appellant also argues that the trial court would not in the future be applied to the
erred in denying his request to terminate child support of the child, it was not an abuse of
support payments to appellee for their oldest discretion for the trial court to deny appelchild because appellee did not maintain cont- lant's counterpetition to terminate child
inuous physical custody of the child. The support payments to appellee during the extextended absence of the oldest child from ended absence.
appellee during the school year, however, did
not extinguish appellant's obligation to
provide adequate child support. See Utah
Code Ann. §78-45-3 (1987). The legal
obligation to support one's child may only be
terminated by the legal adoption of the child
by another person. See Riding v. Riding, 8
Utah 2d 136, 139, 329 P.2d 878, 880 (1958).
Appellant is therefore not excused from his
obligation to support his oldest child simply
because the child resides with and receives care
from a third party, in this case his grandmo-

CONCLUSION
We have reviewed the other issues raised by
appellant and find them to be without merit.
We affirm the trial court's conclusion that a
material change in circumstances has occurred.
We also affirm the denial of appellant's counterpetition. We vacate the trial court's order
increasing the amount of child support and
remand the question of the amount of child
support for further proceedings and entry of
additional findings.
No costs or attorney feci awarded on
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appeal.
Russell W Bench, jua&c
WE CONCUR
Richard C. Davidson, judge
Gregory K. Grme, Judge

j

1. Pursuant to section I, paragraph 5, of the 1988
Guidelines, the three-child schedule was used to
take into account appellant's duty to support the
two children from his marriage to appellee, and a
child from his current marriage. The 1988 Guidelines were repealed in 1989. Effective April 23, 1990,
new child support guidelines were adopted and
codified at Utah Code Ann. §§78-45-2 and 7845-7.2 through-7.18 and apply to child support
modifications on or after July 1, 1989.
2. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7 (1987) was
amended in 1989. See note I.
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF A P P E A L ^
Harry THORSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Marfcay JOHNSON, et ai.
Defendants and Appellees.
Gooseberry Estates, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
Harry Thorsen and Donald Gate»
Defendants and Appellant.
No. 890411-CA
FILED: August 9, 1990
Sixth District, Sevier County
Honorable Don V. Tibbs
ATTORNEYS:
Frederic A. jack man and Michael K. Black,
Orem, for Appellant
Ken Chamberlain, Richfield, for Appellees
Before Judges Greenwood, Davidson, and
Orme.
OPINION
DAVIDSON, Judge:
This case was previously appealed to the
Utah Supreme Court. Thorsen v. Johnson,
745 P.2d 1243 (Utah 1987) (Thorsen 1). The
Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed
m part for reconsideration of damages. We
affirm the trial court's reassessment of
damages.

t T41- \ D V A i
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FACTS
In the original action. Gooseberry Estates
brought an action against Thorsen for
damages Thorsen caused to Gooseberry's
property located in Sevier County. Gooseberry
owned approximately 94 acres of undeveloped
land which it intended to develop as a subdivision. Thorsen, who was a downstream water
user opposed to the development, discovered
that he owned an inactive water easement
across the property. The original ditch, which
was one foot deep and between two and three
feet wide, was washed out in many places and
barely visible. Thorsen entered the property
and excavated the ditch, making it much
larger. In the process, he uprooted several
hundred trees and left huge rocks and other
debris strewn about the property. His efforts
destroyed the possibility of developing the
property.
After a bench trial, the trial court concluded
that Thorsen caused $54,000 in damages calculating the value of the land as a completed
subdivision. The Utah Supreme Court held
that determination of value on the completed
subdivision basis was incorrect. It instead set
forth the following test:
IGJenerally the measure of damages
for injury to real property is the
difference between the vaiue of the
property immediately before and
immediately after the injury ....
Thorsen, 745 P.2d at 1244-45.
The case was remanded to the trial court.
The trial court reviewed additional evidence in
the form of uncontradicted affidavits1 submitted by Gooseberry's experts and determined
that Thorsen caused $38,785 in damages to the
property.2 Thorsen appeals that judgment,
arguing that the trial court again incorrectly
determined the measure of damages.
In the original opinion, the Supreme Court
concluded that the value of the land prior to
damage was Si,250 per acre. Thorsen, V~
P.2d at 1246. It also concluded that Gooseberry was entitled to damages. Id. at 1244-45.
Finally, the Supreme Court determined that it
is proper for the trial court to figure damage*
viewing the property's value in light of its
intended use:
It is proper to show that a particular tract of land is suitable arte
available for subdivision into lots
and is valuable for that purpose. It
is not proper, however, to show the
number and value of lots as separated parcels in an imaginary subdivision thereof. Stated differently, «
is improper for the jury to consider
an undeveloped tract of land ai
though a subdivision thereon is an
accomplished fact. Such undeveloped property may not be valued
E REPORTS
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10. Sec generdlly Groene^eid v Camano Btuepomi
" p a y " Mr. Ailred $100 monthly for the
Oyster Co., 196 Wash 54. 61, 81 P.2d 826, 829 support of Derek. As a convenience, t h e
(1938).
parties stipulated that her monthly payment be
11. Wilson v Schneitcr's Riverside Golf Course,
made in the form of a credit against what Mr
523 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah 1974); see Condos v.
Ailred was required to pay, and thereafter he
Trapp, 717 P.2d 827, 830-32 (Wyo. 1986).
accordingly paid Ms. Alired $600 per m o n t h
12. Condos, 111 P.2d at 830.
toward the support of the two children still in
1J Id. ai 831-32 (last grantee is one who last
her custody.
records —
-t ^Iso Utah Code Ann §§68-31.-2 (;*-e , J
£ JO of common law to statute).
In late 1987, Corey also began living with
Mr. Ailred. On January 19, 1988, Mr. Ailred
filed a petition for modification of the divorce
decree requesting a formal change of custody
Cue as
for Corey and seeking child support. Mr
4 , Utah Adv. Rep. Alired was awarded custody of Corey on
October 7, 1988. On December 2 1 , 1988, a
IN THE
hearing was held to decide the issues of child
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
support, insurance, and medical expenses for
Corey.
J o h n Franklin A L L R E D ,
T h e trial court made several findings. Fin
Plaintiff and Appellant,
dings concerning Ms. Ailred were that 1) she
v.
earned an annual salary of $29,000; 2) Aaryn
Gaydi S. A L L R E B ,
having reached her majority, Ms. Ailred has
Defendant and Appellee.
no minor children in her custody dependent on
her for support; and 3) she is unable to
No. 890335-CA
provide medical coverage for her children on
F I L E D : August 13, 1990
the insurance policy provided by her employer
The court found that Mr. Ailred 1) earned
Third District, Sail Lake C o u n t y
$80,000 in 1986, $52,000 in 1987, and $80,000
Honorable Scott Daniels
in 1988; 2) has experienced a reduction in his
law practice during the past three years, and it
ATTORNEYS:
is unlikely that his income in the future will
Randall Gaither, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
equal or exceed his income for the preceding
Vicki Rinne, Highland, for Appellee
three years; 3) has two minor children in his
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and O r m e
custody dependent on him for support; and 4)
purchases health and accident insurance for
himself and the two children at a price of $104
OPINION
per m o n t h . The court also found that, under
ORME, Judge:
the advisory child support guidelines then
contained in the Utah C o d e of Judicial
Appellant, J o h n Franklin Ailred, appeals
Administration, the total support a m o u n t
from an order which requires nis former wife,
recommended for Corey would be "$937.99 of
Gaydi S. Ailred, to pay $100 per m o n t h in
child support, with those payments to be which $255 was allocable to (Ms. AllredJ with
$683.00 allocable to (Mr. Ailred].* The court
deposited into an interest-bearing account
declined to embrace the guideline recommenearmarked for their child's college education
dation, but also failed to find what was actu
and disbursable only o n the further order of
ally needed for Corey's support, either to
the court. H e argues that the trial court
assure him a level of support equal to what he
abused its discretion in failing to m a k e adeqwould have received had there been no divorce
uate findings of fact, in setting the level of
child support at a level below Ms. Allred's or in terms of what would be appropriate
given his present circumstances.
ability to pay, and in ordering that the support
payments be placed beyond his reach. We
T h e court's pertinent conclusions were as
reverse and remand.
follows:

14

FACTS
The parties were divorced in 1981. For
nearly five years, Ms. Ailred had custody of
ihe parties' three minor children, Aaryn,
Derek, and Corey. Mr. Allred's monthly court
ordered child support was $350 per child.
In January 1986, the parties stipulated to
give custody of Derek to Mr. Ailred and to
cease Mr. Allred's $350 payment for Derek's
support. Moreover, Ms. Ailred agreed to

1. The defendant is entitled u»
child support from plaintiff for the
minor child Corey Ailred.
2. The court elects not to apply
the support amount derived from
the child support guidelines.
3. Plaintiff should pay IO defen
dant the sum of $100.00 per month
... for the minor child Corey Ailred
until such time as the minor child
Corey Ailred obtains the age of 18
years and completes high school.
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court's findings in this case.
5. The defendant shall be solely
ADEQUACY OF TRIAL COURT'S
responsible tor the maintenance of
FINDINGS
insurance for the minor children
At the time of this dispute, the Utah Code
and solely responsible for all costs
|
provided, with our emphasis, that upon a
of medical and dental care not
j
material change in the circumstances of a
covered by such insurance.
divorced couple, such as the change in
In its findings and conclusions, the court did
Corey's custody in this case,
not explain why it elected not to apply the
t h e c o u r t , in d e t e r m i n i n g
the
support guidelines or what factors prompted it
amount of prospective support, shall
to set an award significantly below that suggc o n s i d e r all r e l e v a n t
factors
ested by the guidelines.
including but not limited to:
In a subsequent hearing, the court ordered
(a) the standard of living and
that Ms. Ailred pay the child support into an
situation of the parties;
interest-bearing account in Corey's name,
(b) the relative wealth and income
rather than having it paid to M r . Alired for
ot the parties;
the on-going support needs of Corey. In
(c) the ability of the obligor to
support of this order, the court made the
earn;
following findings: (1) Mr. Alired had previ(d) the ability of the obligee io
ously been given a similar opportunity to
earn;
satisfy a $1000 judgment for back child
(e) the need of the obligee;
support by placing the money in interest(f) the age of the parties;
bearing accounts for the children; (2) it would
(g) the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the
be a good thing for Corey to have the o p p o obligor for the support of others.
rtunity to attend college; (3) it would be more
Utah C o d e A n n . §78-45-7(2) (I987).« This
palatable for Ms. Alired than would be paying
court has recognized that "[sjection 78-45-7
the money directly to Mr. Ailred; and (4) M i .
requires the trial court to consider at least the
Ailred did not actually need the money to
seven factors listed ... [and to] enter findings
support Corey. In the latter regard, the court
on all of the factors." Jeffries, 752 P.2d at
remarked: "I think {Ms. AllredJ is right. You
911 (emphasis added). When the court fails to
know, you can support these children okay.
enter adequate findings on each relevant
The $100.00 a month isn't going to make the
factor, it is reversible error unless the undisdifference between them having shoes and not
puted evidence clearly establishes the factor or
having shoes."
factors on which findings are missing. Ostler,
On appeal, Mr. Ailred argues that the trial
789 P.2d at 715. Findings are adequate only if
court failed to make adequate findings of fact
they are "sufficiently detailed and include
to justify the a m o u n t of child support to be
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
contributed by Ms. Ailred. He also argues that
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual
the court erred in ordering that the support be
issue was reached." Stevens v. Stevens, 754
paid into an interest bearing account earmaP.2d 952, 958 (Utah C t . A p p . 1988) (quoting
rked for C o r e y ' s college education. We
Acton v. De/iran, 737 P.2d 996. 999 (Utah
reverse and remand for reconsideration of the
1987)).
support award and for the entry of adequate
Although the court in this case entered finfindings supporting an appropriate award.
dings on some of the factors listed in §78-45STANDARD OF REVIEW
7(2), the findings as a whole are insufficient,
Ordinarily, we accord the trial court consiespecially since they omit any finding on the
derable discretion in adjusting the financial
critical question of the total a m o u n t needed
interests of divorced parties a n d , thus, the
for Corey's monthly support, other than to
court's "actions are entitled to a presumption
reject what the advisory guidelines would
of validity." Hansen v. Hansen,
736 P.2d
suggest. Moreover, the findings d o not indi1055, 1056 (Utah Ct. A p p . 1987). However,
cate how the court reached its ultimate deterwhere the court has abused its discretion in
mination of $100 per m o n t h - a figure which
apportioning those financial responsibilities,
has no discernible basis in the evidence other
we cannot affirm that determination. Id. See
than it was the figure the parties previously
also Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah
stipulated could be paid for Derek's support
Ct. A p p . 1990). One such abuse we have recwhen his custody shifted to Mr. Alired.
ognized in this area of the law is the failure to
The $100 award in this case may reflect the
enter specific, detailed findings supporting
court's erroneous view of how to fix child
each of the factors which must be considered ! support in the instant context. At one point m
when making a child support award. Stevens • the trial, the court had the following exchange
v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958-59 (Utah Ct. I with the pai ties:
App 1988), Jeffries v. Jeltries, 752 P.2d 909,
Ms. Alired: .. But my question is.
911-12 (Utah Ct. A p p . 1988). With this stait 1 was able to raise three children
ndard in mind, we analyze the adequacy ol the
II f All ADVANCE REPORIS
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on $33 000 a year I question why
John is asking me lor child supper
o raise two on eighty That s ail
have to say
The Court Ail right Mr Ailrcd
she is probably r.ght
Later, the court stated to Mr Allied "l th , k
that she should pay something for the
support of the child, although your income is
greater than hers I am going to order that she
pay the $100 a month
" Finally, as noted
earlier, at the second hearing, the court justi
Tied placement of the funds into a trust
account by stating
You know, you can support those
children okay The $100 a month
isn't going to make the difference
between them having shoes and not
having shoes
I am going to give
the child an opportunity to have a
little money to go to college, and it
would be a good thing for him
Each of these statements appears to reflect the
view that because Mr Alfred's salary was
sufficient to support the children, any amount
from Ms Allred need only be a token gesture *
The taw does not support this position
The trend of the law today is "toward equal
ights and responsibilities for women
req
mnng that the wife contribute child support if
she is financially able in an amount approxi
mately proportional to her financial ability "
Propriety of Decree in Proceeding Between
Divorced Parents to Determine Mother's Duty
to Pay Support for Children in Custody of
Father, 98 A L R 3d 1146, 1150 (1980) Alt
hough apparently never addressing this precise
ssuc before, Utan appellate courts have rec
ognized that "both parents have an obligation
to support their children * Woodward v
Woodward, 709 P 2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985)
^per curiam) This notion of equal rcsponsib
aty is also apparent as a matter of statutory
law in Utah J
Because the court's findings were not ade
quate to support its award and appear to have
oeen tainted by its erroneous view of the
extent to which Ms Allred should be expected
io contribute to Corey's support we must
emand for reconsideration of the support
award and for the entry of adequate findings
supporting an appropnate award
We do not intend our remand to be merely
an exercise in bolstering and supporting the
conclusion already reached Although we
annot decide from the record before us that
$100 is an inadequate award as a matter of
law, we "note the apparent inadequacy in the
amount of the child support award " Ostler
789 P 2d at 715 One hundred dollars is well
below the amount suggested by either the
advisory support guidelines in effect at the
t me of the trial or the subsequently enacted
statutory guidelines now in effect * See Utah
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Code Ann §78 45 7 2(1 )(a) (1990) Evei
when not directly applicable support guide
mes may be relevant in considering the adec,
uacy of an award See Ostler 789 P 2d at 715
16 (noting Utah's current guidelines), Man
inez v Martinez 754 P 2d 69 73 (Utah C t
App 1988) (noting guidelines from other
jurisdictions)
On remand the trial court should employ a
systematic approach, tailored to this situation
where both parents are gainfully employed
which will insure a proper outcome While this
approach has not been clearly enunciated tr
any prior child support decision, it is consis
tent with those decisions It does not ignore
the statutorily mandated factors to be cons
idered, but merely accords them a sensible
priority It is an approach which now enjoys
statutory sanction, see note 8, infra, although
it would be appropriate even without this
legislative endorsement First, the trial cour
must find the amount of total support needed
for the child Jeffries, 752 P 2d at 911 Tna
figure should ideally "assure the children a
standard of living comparable to that which
they would have experienced if no divorce had
occurred " $ Ostler, 789 P 2d at 716 (quoting
Peterson v Peterson 748 P 2d 593, 596 (Utah
Ct App 1988)) Once the total cost ot
support is ascertained, the trial court can
determine through a fairly simple mathemat
ical operation each parent's proportional
share of that support with reference to eaci
parent's share of tbeir comb.ned income Other things being equal the amounts deter
mined through the use of this formula will be
ihe amounts each parent must contribute
However, the court may go on to constde
other appropriate factors, including those
listed in §78 45 7(2), and adjust these
amounts as needed if unusual urcumswexist 7 Unusual circumstances prompting
adjustment of the respective support fi^L
must be adequately supported by deifindings *
Whether $100 is an adequate award given
application of this approach remains to be
seen If it takes just under $400 a month to
support Corey, but there are no unusual arc
umstances prompting some adjustment, then
$100 per month is just right If it takes cons
iderably more than that to support him, but
unusual circumstances exist in Ms Allred's
favor for which no countervailing circumsta
nces exist in Mr Allred's favor, it may still be
acceptable But n it takes more than $400 per
month to support Corey and no such unusual
circumstances are shown Ms Allred's
support obligation needs to be increased to an
amount proportional to her income
We reverse and remand for reconsideration
of the support award using the analytical
approach outlined herein The final determi
nation must be supported by adequate findings
made in the course of employing this appr
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ible co payment
and other out of pocket
medical expenditures should either be built into the
court s calculation of Corey s monthly total
support need and shared proportionally in that way
or those expenses should be defrayed by the parties
on a proportional basis as they are incurred
5 The advisory guidelines apparently suggested a
total support amount for Corey of $937 99 The
court did not indicate in its findings whether this
amount would provide the standard of living Corey
might have assuming no divorce nor did it find what
would constitute that amount nor the amount
needed to support him under his present circumsta
nces
6 The child suppo i worksheet completed by Mr
Allred for the support hearing suggested that Ms
Allred s proportionate share of Corey s support
based upon their combined income would be app
roximalely 27%
7 The findings currently before ihis court do noi
establish any unusual circumstances applicable to
either party which suggest that Ms Allred s suppor
payments should be increased or decreased beyond
her proportional share Persuasive reasons for adj
ustment may include among other things a party s
significant accumulated wealth over and above his
Gregory k Orme, Judge
or her salary an extraordinary debt burden incurred
for non discretionary items medical problems
WE CONCUR
requiring exceptional on going expense a history
Richard C Davidson Judge
of "below scale" support levels during the time when
Russell W Bench, Judge
the parent now having custody and seeking support
from the other parent had been the parent paying
1 We quoie the statute as it existed when this case J support or competing demands on his or her
was decided it has subsequently been amended
income in ihe form ot support for other dependents
principally to lake into consideration the existence
8 The orderly scheme just outlined has now been
of new statutory child support guidelines and the
statutorily adopted Calculation of the parent s
relationship of the factors to those guidelines and
support obligation is defined in Utah Code Ann
to expand subsection (e) to include the needs of the ] §78 45 7 7 (1990) which provides in pertinent
obligor and the child as well as those of the obligee
pan
See Utah Code Ann §78 45 7(3) (1990)
(1) The parents child support obligation
2 The court s order placing ihe money into a kind
shall be divided between them in prop
of trust account for college is itself indicative of the
onion to their adjusted gross incomes
court s erroneous view concerning child support
(2) Except in cases of joint physical
Child support should be used to "assure the children '
custody and split custody as defined in
a standard of living comparable to that which they !
S e c t i o n 78 45 2 the t o t a l child
would have experienced if no divorce had occurred " 1
support awa d shall be determined as
Ostler 789 P 2d at 716 not to assure that the child j
follows
will have money in the future even for such worthy
(a) Combine the adjusted gross
pursuits like a college education
!
incomes of the parents and determine
3 Utah statutes draw no distinction in terms of
the base combined child support obhg
support duty between custodial and non custodial
ation using the child support obligation
parents nor between fathers and mothers The duty
table
of both is ihe same "Every man shall support his
(b) Calculate each parent s proporti
child
" Uiah Code Ann §78 45 3 (1987)
onate share of the base combined child
"Every woman shall support her child
" Utah
support obligation by multiplying the
Code Ann §78 45 4(1987)
combined child support obligation by
4 As recognized by the court in its findings and
each parent s percentage of combined
onclusions the advisory support guidelines would
adjusted gross income
nave imposed a support obligation on Ms Allred of
"ITJhe award amounts resulting from the apphc
approximately $255 Utah Code of Judicial Admin
anon of the guidelines are presumed to be correc
app H (1988) An award under the statutory guid
Utah Code Ann §78 45 n 2(2>(b) i!990, uu»
-hies now in effect would be approximately $2SO
may
be rebutted if there is
J t a h Code Ann
§§78 45 7 7 7 14 (1990)
{a) written finding or specific finding on
However the level of support fixed in this case is |
the record supporting the conclusion
additionally skewed against Mr Allred by the fact
that complying with a provision of the
hat 100% ol one aspect of Corey s support
guidelines or ordering an award amount
namely medical expenses was to be borne exdusi
resulting from the use of the guidelines
vely by Mr Allred It may well be prudent to
require Mr Allred to continue to pay medical ins I
would be unjust inappropriate or not
irancc premiums on behalt ot Corey so long as j
in the best interest of a child
those amounts are properly credited as part ot the
support Mr Allred is contributing But the deduct

oach

TRUST ACCOUNT
The court ordered the $100 support pa>rn
ents to be placed into a trust account es^emi
ally for the purpose of "giv[ingl the thud an
opportunity to have a little money to go to
college " As previously noted a child support
award "should approximate actual need and,
when possible assure the children a standard
ol living comparable to that which they would
have experienced if no divorce had occurred "
Ostler, 789 P 2d at 716 (quoting Peterson v
Peterson, 748 P 2d 593, 5% (Utah Ct App
1988)) Placing child support payments into a
trust fund beyond the reach of the custodial
parent does not serve the immediate needs of
the child and thus does not serve the purpose
of the obligation Thus, we hold that once the
support obligation has been properly determ
ined it must be paid direcuy o Mr Allred or
otherwise made available o him for the on
going support of Corey
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Utah C o d e A n n . §78-45-7.2(3) (1990)
If the
court finds sufficient evidence t o suggest deviation
from the guidelines, the court shall establish support
after considering all relevant factors, including those
listed in §78-45-7(3)(I990).
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NEWEY. Judge:
Defendant Devin Anderson was convicied of
the theft of $17.75-worth of gasoline in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404
(1990). After receiving evidence of prior theft
convictions, the trial court in this case determined that Anderson had earlier been twice
convicted of theft, and, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-412(l)(b)(ii) (1990),
classified this crime as a third-degree felony.
Anderson appeals the classification of this
offense, and we reverse its classification as a
third-degree felony.
To establish two prior theft convictions, the
State introduced evidence drawn from records
of the Utah circuit courts and consisting
mainly of preprinted forms filled in by a court
clerk. One such form was entitled
"Information," dated "8 Dec 1981," and
captioned "Salt Lake City ... vs. Anderson,
Devin." In it, a person whose name is illegible
complains that a Devin Anderson committed
petty larceny by stealing "merchandise having
a value not exceeding $100.00 ....* The disposition of the charge is not shown except in
notes apparently made by the clerk after locating the records in 1988, notes which say that
the "Defendant was convicted of the charge
below." The clerk who located the records did
not testify at trial; from the signature certif-
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ying the copies, the clerk's name appears to
be "Chris Peifili," although it is difficult to
read the handwritten surname.
Another form dated "12 02-83* showed
the plaintiff as "SLC," a common abbreviation for Salt Lake City, and "Devin Anderson" as the defendant. The defendant was not
further identified. The name of a circuit judge
appeared and a notation indicated that the
defendant acted pro se, but plaintiff's counsel
was not listed. The only indication of what
took place in this case was the following
cryptic, handwritten notation:
1589DPWOC
c/o sent-15 dsjspf $200.00
1202-83
At trial, the State proffered tie testimony of
Carolyn Bullock, a court cler*. to the effect
that this notation would indicate a conviction
for retail theft.
The State's final exhibit was entitled
"Circuit Court Criminal Case Filing/
Disposition Report" dated "11/8/82 from
the then Ninth Circuit Court, Cedar City
Department. It showed the defendant as
"Devin Lincoln Anderson" and identified him
by date of birth and gender. Defendant was
charged with "defrauding an innkeeper" in
violation of local ordinance 38-15. The form
further indicates that the defendant changed
his plea to guilty and the case was concluded
on that basis, with the defendant sentenced to
pay a fine and make restitution. The form r
not signed.
Based on this evidence, the trial court founn
that all three exhibits established prior convi
ctions of Anderson for theft-type offenses.
and accordingly enhanced the penalty fo=
Anderson's present conviction pursuant ic
section 76-6-412(1 Kb) (ii). Before the tna.
court and here on appeal, Anderson ar£ue
that the penalty should not have been c ir
need because the State failed to show 1-judgments against Anderson had been vu_...
entered in the prior proceedings.
At common law, the judgment in a criminal
case was usually nothing more than the oral
declaration of guilt and sentence, pronounced
while a clerk took notes.2 The practice of
rendering oral judgments in criminal cases has
persisted to this day in many courts, including
apparently many of the Utah circuit courts,
despite sound reasons opposing its continuation. Those reasons include the following: (1)
entry of a time-stamped, written judgment
fixes clearly on the recoid the date of the
judgment, thereby simplifying the question of
when the time begins to run for post-trial
motions, filing notice of appeal, and for any
probation ordered;3 (2) a written judgment in
proper form is clear evidence of the defendant's conviction in later proceedings;4 (3) a
written judgment signed by the judge helps
assure the absence of clerical error or misun-
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derstanding in the record and shows that responsibility for the judgment rests on the shoulders of the judge; and (4) it provides at least
the beginning of a basis for meaningful review
of the judgment.5 Accordingly, the Model
Penal Code §§7.03 and 7.04, the American
Bar Association Standard for Criminal Justice
18-6.6, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32(b)(1), and many states* have departed from
the common law practice and require entry of
a written result in a criminal case.
In Utah, the end of the former practice of
unwritten criminal judgments is mandated by
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 81(e), which
serves generally to unify civil and criminal
procedure in Utah except where a statute or
rule provides otherwise for criminal cases.7 We
know of no statute or rule countermanding* in
criminal cases the requirement of Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 58A that the court (or the
clerk in the case of a verdict) sign and file a
written judgment;' on the contrary, a criminal
statute requires that the judgment state in
writing the reasons for any required restitution. w We see no reason why the circuit court
should be required to adjudicate civil cases in
writing pursuant to rule 58A but nevertheless
impose the more onerous criminal penalties
and leave only a vague, secondary record of
the judgment.
In this case, the 1981 information is not a
conviction, but rather only a charge." There is
nothing in that case to show that the defendant was convicted of the charged petty
larceny except the notation nine years later of
an unidentified Chris P«. The cryptic
notations from 1983 can be deciphered as
showing a conviction only with recourse to the
interpretation of an experienced circuit court
clerk familiar with the clerical shorthand of
the time, but in themselves are utterly vague
and unintelligible.12 The 1982 record is considerably better than those from 1981 and 1983,
but still fails to comply with the requirement
of rules 58A(b) and 81(e) that the court sign
the judgment. Absent any showing that a
signed, written judgment against Anderson
was entered, the evidence is inadequate to
support the trial court's finding that Anderson
had been twice convicted of theft. Thus, the
finding to that effect is clearly erroneous. See
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah
1987). Our ruling thus requires that a judgment of prior conviction be written, clear and
definite, and signed by the court (or the cierk
in a jury case) in order to serve as the basis
for enhancing a penalty pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-412(l)(b)(u)( 1990)."
From what appears to have been the prevailing practice, many enhancements of the
classification of theft pursuant to §76-6412(1) may have been based on unwritten
judgments and fragmentary evidence.
However, previously enhanced theft convictions should not now be reversed or held
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invalid by our ruling, which applies only
prospectively. See State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d
670, 672 n.i (Utah 1989); State v. Norton, 675
P.2d 577 (Utah 1983) cert, denied 466 U.S.
942 (1984), overruled on other grounds, Sure
v. Hansen, 784 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986); State v.
Vasilacopoulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
The enhancement of Anderson's penalty
and the classification of his offense as a thirddegree felony are therefore reversed, and the
case is remanded for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
Robert L. Newey, Juage
WE CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile C o u r t Judge,
sitting by special a p p o i n t m e n t p u r s u a n t t o Utah
C o d e A n n . §78-3-24(10) ( S u p p . 1990).
2. See Miller v. Sanford,
161 F . 2 d 2 9 1 , 292 (5ih Cir
1947).
3 . SeeSather
v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 ( U t a h 1986); Sail
Lake Cuy v. Griffin,
750 P . 2 d 194 ( U t a h C t .
A p p . 1988), see also 6A J. M o o r e & J Lucas, Moore's
hederal
Practice
§58.02.1
(1989); C
Wright & A . Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure.
§2652(1983).
4 . At c o m m o n taw, there was little need to introd u c e evidence of a prior conviction. T h e c o m m o n
law did not e n h a n c e penalties based o n prior convictions, a n d there was less need to d o so, since the
penalty for a first offense of larceny, for e x a m p l e ,
was originally d e a t h , eliminating the possibility of it
subsequent conviction. R. Perkins & R. Boyce,
Criminal
Law and Procedure
174 (6th ed. 1984)
H o w e v e r , m a l i m e of less drastic p u n i s h m e n t s and
a greater effort to address recidivism, there is a need
in every proceeding to m a k e a record that can later
be used 10 d e t e r m i n e whether the defendant has a
l o n g s t a n d i n g p r o b l e m in the area of the subsequent
charge.
Besides the need to know of previous convictions
for later sentence e n h a n c e m e n t s , there is a need t o
be able to reliably d e t e r m i n e whether the defendant
h a s already been in j e o p a r d y for the offense, a n d a
need t o keep a person's record a n d r e p u t a t i o n clear
of s p u r i o u s criminal implications.
5. Appellate courts have often noted in cases reman d e d for lack of findings that we c a n n o t review a
case o n appeal if we c a n n o t ascertain what the t n # !
court decided. Andrus v. Baglcy. 775 P 2d 934, 93ft
( U t a h 1988); Smith v. Smith, 776 P.2d 4 2 3 , 426
( U t a h 1986); see also State v tamper,
770 I>.2u
1125 ( U t a h 1989); State v. Nelson, 725 P . 2 d 1353,
1356 ( U t a h 1986).
6. See, e.g., Fisher v. State, 482 So 2d 587 (Fia. Ct
A p p . 1986), Bishop v State, 176 Gd A p p 357, 335
S . h . 2 d 742 (1985); State v. Suchanek,
326 N . W 2d
263. 265 (Iowa 1982), Commonwealth
v. Foster, 229
P a . S u p e r . 269, 324 A 2d 538 (1974); S t a t e v. Dean,
107 O h i o A p p . 219, 158 N.E.2d 217, 224 (1958)
( d i c t u m ) ; State v. Vinson. 337 M o 1023, 87 S.W 2d
637, 639 (1935); State ex rel Echtle v. Card, 148
W a s h . 270, 268 P . 869(1928).
7. Rule 81(e) provides:

| i f A l l AHVANCI- R t P O R I < <

423
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence

^AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES

A M E N D M E N T VII
ENDMEKTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS]
3NDMENTS XI-XXVI
AMENDMENT I
ligious and political freedom.,
»ngress shall make no law respecting an estabnent of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
'4of; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
**; or the right of the people peaceably to assemmd to petition the Government for a redress of
ances,
A M E N D M E N T II
t to b e a r arms.]
fli-regulated Militia, being necessary to the se^ of a free State, the right of the people to keep
•^ar Arms, shall not be infringed.
A M E N D M E N T III
««ering soldiers.]
t i d i e r shall, in time of peace, be quartered in
u«?e, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
f war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
A M E N D M E N T IV
a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s a n d seizures.]
e right of the people to be secure in their perhouses, papers, and effects, against unreasonsearches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
^rted by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
ibing the place to be searched, and the persons
ungs to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
jiinal actions — P r o v i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g —
Due p r o c e s s of l a w a n d j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n
clauses.]
• person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
lictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
i land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
il service in time of War or public danger; nor
any person be subject for the same oflence to be
• put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com(1 in any criminal case to be a witness against
olf, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
>ut due process of law; nor shall private property
<ken for public use, without just compensation.
A M E N D M E N T VI
hts of accused.]
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
lght to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
of the State and district wherein the crime shall
been committed, which district shall have been
lously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-

..Trial by j u r y in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT VHI
[Bail — P u n i s h m e n t . ]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessivfines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment?
inflicted.
A M E N D M E N T IX
[Rights r e t a i n e d b y people.)
The enumeration in the Constant,on, of certair
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people
AMENDMENT X
i P o w e r s r e s e r v e d to s t a t e s o r people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
A M E N D M E N T XI
[Suits a g a i n s t s t a t e s — R e s t r i c t i o n of judicial
power.]
The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com
menced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.
A M E N D M E N T XII
I Election of P r e s i d e n t a n d Vice-President.]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states,
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President,
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of
the same state with themselves; they shall name in
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for ae
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The
person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and
if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three
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on the list of those voted for as President, the House
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President But in choosing the President, the
votes shall be taken by states, the representation
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this
purpose shall consist of a member or members from
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House
of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of
the death or other constitutional disability of the
President —The person having the greatest number
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the
United States.
A M E N D M E N T XIII
Section
1. |Slavery prohibited ]
2. IPower to enforce amendment.;
Section 1.
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shah
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Sec. 2. ( P o w e r to enforce a m e n d m e n t . ]
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
A M E N D M E N T XIV
Section
1. {Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal p r o t c
tion.J
2. (Representatives — Power to reduce appointment i
3 (Disqualification to hold office.J
4. (Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be
paid |
(Power to enforce amendment. 1
s e c t i o n i.

(Citizenship — D u e p r o c e s s of i a w —
Equal protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s — P o w e r to r e d u c e a p pointment.!
Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to

Amend. XVI

vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in
the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Sec. 3. (Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice President,
or hold any office, civil or military, under the United
States, or under any State, who, having previously
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an
officer of the United States, or as a member of any
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer
of any State, to support the Constitution of the
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to
the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability
Sec. 4.

(Public d e b t n o t to b e q u e s t i o n e d —
D e b t s of t h e C o n f e d e r a c y a n d claims
n o t to b e paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United State-?,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any StaU1
shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of
any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims
shall be held illegal and void.
Sec. 5. ( P o w e r to e n f o r c e a m e n d m e n t . ]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by BI>
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article
A M E N D M E N T XV
Section
1. | Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to
disqualify.)
2. IPower to enforce amendment J
Section 1. (Right of citizens to vote — R a c e o r
color n o t to disqualify.!
The right of citizens of the United States to votr
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.
Sec. 2. ( P o w e r to enforce a m e n d m e n t . }
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
A M E N D M E N T XVI

Sec. 2.

[ I n c o m e tax.]
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several States,
and without regard to any census or enumeration.
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ourrence of a majority of all justices of the supreme
court. If a justice of the supreme court is disqualified
or otherwise unable to participate in a cause before
the court, the chief justice, or in the event the chief
justice is disqualified or unable to participate, the
remaining justices, shall call an active judge from an
appellate court or the district court to participate in
the cause.
1985
Sec. 3 [Jurisdiction of s u p r e m e court.]
The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction
to issue all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United
States. The supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue ail writs and
orders necessary for the exercise of the supreme
court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of
any cause.
1985
Sec. 4.

[ R u l e - m a k i n g p o w e r of s u p r e m e c o u r t
— J u d g e s p r o tempore — Regulation
of p r a c t i c e of law.]
The supreme court shall adopt rules of procedure
and evidence to be used in the courts of the state and
shall by rule manage the appellate process. The legislature may amend the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the supreme court upon a vote of
two-thirds of all members of both houses of the legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the supreme court by rule may authorize retired
justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform
any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The supreme court by
rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline
of persons admitted to practice law.
1986
Sec. 5.

[ J u r i s d i c t i o n of district c o u r t a n d o t h e r
c o u r t s — R i g h t of a p p e a l . ]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in
all matters except as limited by this constitution or
by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs.
The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other
courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided
by statute. Except for matters filed originally with
the supreme court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to
a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
1985

[ N u m b e r of j u d g e s of disL
-ourt a n d
o t h e r c o u r t s — DivisionThe number of judges of the district ^ourt and of
other courts of record established by the legislature
shall be provided by statute. No change in the number of judges shall have the effect of removing a judge
from office during a judge's term of office. Geographic
divisiors for all courts of record except the supreme
court may be provided by statute. No change in divisions shall have the effect of removing a judge from
office during a judge's term of office.
1985

436

sions are provided for any court, judges of that court
shall reside in the geographic division for which they
are selected.
isss
Sec. 8.

[Vacancies — N o m i n a t i n g commissions
— S e n a t e approval.I
When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the
governor shall fill the vacancy by appointment from a
list of at least three nominees certified to the governor by the judicial nominating commission having
authority over the vacancy. The governor shall fil
the vacancy within 30 days after receiving the list of
nominees. If the governor fails to fill the vacancy
within the time prescribed, the chief justice of the
supreme court shall within 20 days make the appointment from the list of nominees. The legislature
by statute shall provide for the nominating commissions' composition and procedures. No member of the
legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the
legislature appoint members to, any judicial nominating commission. The senate shall consider and
render a decision on each judicial appointment within
30 days of the date of appointment. If necessary, the
senate shall convene itself in extraordinary session
for the purpose of considering judicial appointments.
The appointment shall be effective upon approval of a
majority of all members of the senate. If the senate
fails to approve the appointment, the office shall be
considered vacant and a new nominating process
shall commence. Selection of judges shall be based
solely upon consideration of fitness for office without
regard to any partisan political considerations. 1986
Sec. 9. (Judicial r e t e n t i o n elections.]
Each appointee to a court of record shall be subject
to an unopposed retention election at the first general
election held more than three years after appointment. Following initial voter approval, each supreme
court justice every tenth year, and each judge of other
courts of record every sixth year, shall be subject to
an unopposed retention election at the corresponding
general election. Judicial retention elections shall be
held on a nonpartisan ballot in a manner provided by
statute. If geographic divisions are provided for any
court of record, the judges of those courts shall stand
for retention election only in the geographic division
to which they are selected.
1985
Sec. 10. [Restrictions o n j u s t i c e s a n d judges.]
Supreme court justices, district court judges, and
judges of all other courts of record while holding office
may not practice law, hold any elective nonjudicial
public office, or hold office in a political party.
1988

Sec, 6.

Sec. 7. [Qualifications of j u s t i c e s a n d j u d g e s . ]
Supreme court justices shall be at least 30 years
old, United States citizens, Utah residents for five
years preceding selection, and admitted to practice
law in Utah. Judges of other courts of record shall be
at least 25 years old, United States citizens, Utah
residents for three years preceding selection, and admitted to practice law in Utah. If geographic divi-

Sec. 11. [ J u d g e s of c o u r t s n o t of record.]
Judges of courts not of record shall be selected in a
manner, for a term, and with qualifications provided
by statute. However, no qualification may be imposed
which requires judges of courts not of record to be
admitted to practice law. The number of judges of
courts not of record shall be provided by statute. 1988
Sec. 12. [Judicial Council — Chief j u s t i c e a s adm i n i s t r a t i v e officer.l
A Judicial Council is established, which shall adopt
rules for the administration of the courts of the state.
The Judicial Council shall consist of the chief justice
of the supreme court, as presiding officer, and such
other justices, judges, and other persons as provided
by statute. There shall be at least one representative
on the Judicial Council from each court established
by the constitution or by statute. The chief justice of
the supreme court shall be the chief administrative
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officer for the courts and shall implement the rules
adopted by the Judicial Council.
1955
Sec. 13. {Judicial C o n d u c t Commission.]
A Judicial Conduct Commission is established
which shall investigate and conduct confidential
hearings regarding complaints against any justice or
judge. Following its investigations and hearings, the
Judicial Conduct Commission may order the reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary
retirement of any justice or judge for the following:
(1) action which constitutes willful misconduct in
office;
(2) final conviction of a crime punishable as a felony under state or federal law;
(3) willful and persistent failure to perform judicial
duties;
(4) disability that seriously interferes with the performance of judicial duties; or
(5) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a judicial office into disrepute.
Prior to the implementation of any commission order, the supreme court shall review the commission's
proceedings as to both law and fact. The court may
also permit the introduction of additional evidence.
After its review, the supreme court shall, as it finds
just and proper, issue its order implementing, rejecting, or modifying the commission's order. The Legislature by statute shall provide for the composition
and procedures of the Judicial Conduct Commission.
1985

Sec. 14. [ C o m p e n s a t i o n of j u s t i c e s a n d judges.)
The Legislature shall provide for the compensation
of all justices and judges. The salaries of justices and
judges shall not be diminished during their terms of
office.
1985
Sec. 15. [ M a n d a t o r y r e t i r e m e n t . 1
The Legislature may provide standards for the
mandatory retirement of justices and judges from of™ ce -

1985

Sec. 16. 1 P u b l i c p r o s e c u t o r s . !
-The Legislature shall provide for a system of public
)f08ecutors who shall have primary responsibility for
ihe prosecution of criminal actions brought in the
lame of the State of Utah and shall perform such
>ther duties as may be provided by statute. Public
>rosecutors shall be elected in a manner provided by
itatute, and shall be admitted to practice law in
Jtah. If a public prosecutor fails or refuses to proserute, the supreme court shall have power to appoint a
prosecutor pro tempore.
i9 85
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A R T I C L E IX
CONGRESSIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE
APPORTIONMENT

Section
. {Apportionment. 1
Number of members of Legislature]
Renumbered.}
iepealed.J
ion 1. ( A p p o r t i o n m e n t ]
v- the session next following an enumeration made
y the authority of the United States, the Legislature
hell divide the state into congressional, legislative,
nd other districts accordingly.
1^9
ec. 2. I N u m b e r of m e m b e r s of Legislature.]

Art. X, |

The Senate shall consist of a membership not t
exceed twenty-nine in number, and the number ••
representatives shall never be less than twice no
greater than three times the number of senators
Sec. 3.

[ R e n u m b e r e d as Section 2 of this Ar(»
cle.]
,9K

Sec. 4.

[Repealed.]
ARTICLE X
EDUCATION

Section
1. I Free nonsectarian schools.]
2. [Defining what shall constitute the public schoo
system. I
3. I State Board of Education]
4. [Control of higher education system by statute Rights and immunities confirmed.)
5. [State School Fund and Uniform School Fund Establishment and use.]
6. [Repealed.]
7. [Proceeds of land grants constitute permancn*
funds.]
8. [No religious or partisan tests in schools]
9. [Public aid to church schools forbidden I
10. I Repealed. I
11. [Repealed.]
12. I Renumbered.!
13. [Renumbered.]
Section 1. [Free n o n s e c t a r i a n schools.}
The Legislature shall provide for the establishment
and maintenance of the state's education systems in
eluding: (a) a public education system, which shall In
open to all children of the state; and <h) a highi-i
education system. Both systems shall be free from
sectarian control.
>
imi
Sec. 2.

[Defining w h a t shall c o n s t i t u t e the public school system.!
The public education system shall include all public elementary and secondary schools and such other
schools and programs as the Legislature may designate. The higher education system shall include all
public universities and colleges and such other institutions and programs as the Legislature may designate. Public elementary and secondary schools shall
be free, except the Legislature may authorize the imposition of fees in the secondary schools.
ips?
Sec. 3. [State B o a r d of Education.]
The general control and supervision of the public
education system shall be vested in the State Board of
Education. The membership of the board shall be established and elected as provided by statute. The
State Board of Education shall appoint a State Superintendent of Public Instruction who shall be the executive officer of the board.
i9fl7
Sec. 4.

[Control of higher e d u c a t i o n system b y
s t a t u t e — Rights a n d immunities confirmed.]
The genera] control and supervision of the higher
education system shall be provided for by statute. All
rights, immunities, franchises, and endowments originally established or recognized by the constitution
for any public university or college are confirmed.
IPS7
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tenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining
iild support, an order assigning financial responsiility for all or a portion of child care expenses inured on behalf of the dependent children, necessitted by the employment or training of the custodial
»rent. If the court determines that the eircumances are appropriate and that the dependent chilren would be adequately cared for, it may include an
der allowing the non-custodial parent to provide
ie day care for the dependent children, necessitated
. the employment or training of the custodial par3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
ibsequent changes or new orders for the support and
aintenanee of the parties, the custody of the chilen and their support, maintenance, health, and
utal care, or the distribution of the property as is
asonable and necessary.
14) In determining visitation rights of parents,
.tndparenta, and other relatives, the court shall
usider the welfare of the child.
5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
icrwise, any order of the court that a party pay
mony to a former spouse automatically terminates
»n the remarriage of that former spouse. However,
he remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab
(io, payment of alimony shall resume if the party
ving alimony is made a party to the action of anIment and his rights are determined.
»») Any order of the court that a party pay alimony
t former spouse terminates upon establishment by
party paying alimony that the former spouse is
iding with a person of the opposite sex. However, if
•A further established by the person receiving aliny that that relationship or association is without
,' sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
/) When a petition for modification of child cusv or visitation provisions of a court order is made
i denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay
reasonable attorney's fees expended by the preiing party in that action, if the court determines
i the petition was without merit and not asserted
MKJ faith.
1B85
t-5.1.

Provision for i n c o m e w i t h h o l d i n g in
child s u p p o r t o r d e r .
. henever a court enters an order for child support,
uall include in the order a provision for withholdmcome as a means of collecting child support aa
tded in Chapter 45df Title 78.
1MB
5.2.

Allegations of child a b u s e o r child sexu a l a b u s e — Investigation.
hen, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request
nodification of a divorce decree, an allegation of
I abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating
r party, the court shall order that an investigat e conducted by the Division of Family Services
in the Department of Social Services in accore with Part 5, Chapter 4 of Title 62A. A final
d of custody or visitation may not be rendered
I a report on that investigation is received by the
t. That investigation shall be conducted by the
uon of Family Services within 30 days of the
f s notice and request for an investigation.
isss
6. R e p e a l e d .

IBSS

7. When d e c r e e b e c o m e s a b s o l u t e .
e decree of divorce becomes absolute on the date
signed by the court and entered by the clerk in

94fc

tiie register of actions or at the expiration of a period
of time the court may specifically designate, unless
an appeal or other proceedings for review are pending
or the court, before the decree becomes absolute, for
sufficient cause otherwise orders. The court, upon application or on its own motion for good cause shown,
may waive, alter, or extend a designated period of
time before the decree becomes absolute, but not to
exceed six months from the signing and entry of the
decree.
196&
30-3-8. R e m a r r i a g e — When unlawful.
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dissolves their marriage by decree may marry any person other than the spouse from whom the divorce was
granted until it becomes absolute. If an appeal is
taken, the divorce is not absolute until after affirmance of the decree.
less
30-3-9.

Repealed.

im

30-3-10. Custody of children in c a s e of separation or divorce — C u s t o d y consideration.
(1) if a husband and wife having minor children
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future
care and custody of the minor children as it considers
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall
consider the best interests of the child and the past
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of
the parties. The court may inquire of the children and
take into consideration the children's desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are
not controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider,
among other factors the court finds relevant, which
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the
child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the
court finds appropriate.
less
30-3-10.1. J o i n t legal c u s t o d y defined.
In this chapter, "joint legal custody".
(1) means the sharing of the rights, privileges,
duties, and powers of a parent by both parents,
where specified;
(2) may include an award of exclusive authority by the court to one parent to make specific
decisions;
(3) does not affect the physical custody of the
child except as specified in the order of joint legal
custody;
(4) is not based on awarding equal or nearly
equal periods of physical custody of and access to
the child to each of the parents, as the best interest of the child often requires that a primary
physical residence for the child be designated;
and
(5) does not prohibit the court from specifying
one parent as the primary caretaker and one
home as the primary residence of the child, issa

30-3-10.2. J o i n t legal custody o r d e r — F a c t o r s
for c o u r t d e t e r m i n a t i o n — P u b l i c assistance.
(1) There is a rebuttable presumption, subject to
Subsection (2), that joint legal custody is in the best
interest of a child.
(2) The court may order joint legal custody if it
determines that:
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(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal
custody;
(b) joint legal custody is in the best interest of
the child; and
(c) both parents appear capable of implementing joint legal custody.
(3) In determining the best interest of a child, the
court shall consider the following factors:
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and
emotional needs and development of the child
will benefit from joint legal custody;
(b) the ability of the parents to give first priority to the welfare of the child and reach shared
decisions in the child's best interest;
(c) whether each parent is capable of encouraging and accepting a positive relationship between the child and the other parent;
(d) whether both parents participated in raising the child before the filing of the suit;
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of
the parents;
(f) if the child is 12 years of age or older, any
preference of the child for or against joint legal
custody; and
(g) any other factors the court finds relevant.
(4) The determination of the best interest of the
child shall be by a preponderance of the evidence.
(5) The court shall inform both parties that an order for joint custody may preclude eligibility for public assistance in the form of aid to families with dependent children, and that if public assistance is required for the support of children of the parties at any
time subsequent to an order of joint legal custody, the
order may be terminated under Section 30-3-10.4.
(6) The court may recommend that where possible
the parties attempt to settle future disputes by a dispute resolution method before seeking enforcement or
modification of the terms and conditions of the order
of joint legal custody through litigation, except in
emergency situations requiring ex parte orders to
protect the child.
isss
30-3-10.3. T e r m s of j o i n t legal custody o r d e r .
(1) An order of joint legal custody shall provide
terms the court determines appropriate, which may
include specifying:
(a) either the county of residence of the child,
until altered by further order of the court, or the
custodian who has the sole legal right to determine the residence of the child;
(b) that the parents shall exchange information concerning the health, education, and welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before making decisions concerning any of these
areas;
(c) the rights and duties of each parent regarding the child's present and future physical care,
support, and education;
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the
child's attendance at school and other activities,
his daily routine, and his association with
friends; and
(e) as necessary the remaining parental rights,
privileges, duties, and powers to be exercised by
the parents solely, concurrently, or jointly.
(2) The court shall, where possible, include in the
order the terms agreed to between the parties.
(3) Any parental rights not specifically addressed
by the court order may be exercised by the parent
having physical custody of the child, the majority of
the time.

30-3-10.6

(4) (a) The appointment of joint legal custodians?
does not impair or limit the authority of the court .r
to order support of the child, including payments )
by one custodian to the other.
(b) An order of joint legal custody, in itself, is
not grounds for modifying a support order.
(5) The agreement may contain a dispute resolution procedure the parties agree to use before seeking
enforcement or modification of the terms and conditions of the order of joint legal custody through litigation, except in emergency situations requiring ex
parte orders to protect the child.
i988
30-3-10.4. Modification o r termination of order.
(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal
custodians the court may, after a hearing, modify an
order that established joint legal custody if:
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or
both custodians have materially and substantially changed since the entry of the order to be
modified, or the order has become unworkable or
inappropriate under existing circumstances; and
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions
of the decree would be an improvement for and in
the best interest of the child.
(2) (a) The order of joint legal custody is terminated upon the filing of a motion for termination
by:
(i) both parents; or
(ii) one parent, when notice of the motion
is sent by certified mail to the other parent
and an affidavit is filed with the motion, indicating the motion has been mailed as required by this subsection,
(b) The order of joint legal custody shall be replaced by the court with an order of sole legal
custody under Section 30-3-10. All related issues,
including visitation and child support, shall also
be determined and ordered by the court.
(3) If the court finds that an action under this section is filed or answered frivolously and in a manner
designed to harass the other party, the court shall
assess attorney's fees as costs against the offending
party.
um
30-3-10.5.

P a y m e n t s of s u p p o r t , m a i n t e n a n c e ,
a n d alimony.
Unless the order or decree providing for support,
maintenance, or alimony under this chapter or Chapter 4, Title 30, provides a different time for payment,
all monthly payments of support, maintenance, or alimony provided for in the order or decree shall be due
one-half by the 5th day of each month, and the remaining one-half by the 20th day of that month. i»&s
30-3-10.6.

P a y m e n t u n d e r child s u p p o r t o r d e r
— Judgment.
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal
support under any child support order, as defined by
Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on and after the date it
is due:
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and
effect of any judgment of a district court, except
as provided in Subsection (2);
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and
credit in this and in any other jurisdiction; and
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by
this or any other jurisdiction, except as provided
in Subsection (2).
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a
child support order may be modified with respect to
any period during which a petition for modification is
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition
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was given to the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner.
(3) For purposes of this section, "jurisdiction"
means a state or political subdivision, a territory or
possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(4) The judgment provided for in Subsection (l)(a),
to be effective and enforceable as a lien against the
real property interest of any third party relying on
the public record, shall be docketed in the district
court in accordance with Sections 78-22-1 and
S2A-11-311.
1IMM>
30-3-11. Repealed.

i

l&si

30-3-11.1. Family C o u r t Act — P u r p o s e .
It is the public policy of the state of Utah to
strengthen the family life foundation of our society
and reduce the social and economic costs to the state
resulting from broken homes and to take reasonable
measures to preserve marriages, particularly where
minor children are involved. The purposes of this act
are to protect the rights of children and to promote
the public welfare by preserving and protecting family life and the institution of matrimony by providing
the courts with further assistance for family counseling, the reconciliation of spouses and the amicable
settlement of domestic and family controversies. 1868
30-3-11.2. A p p o i n t m e n t of c o u n s e l for child.
If, in any action before any court of this state involving the custody or support of a child, it shall appear in the best interests of the child to have a separate exposition of the issues and personal representation for the child, the court may appoint counsel to
represent the child throughout the action, and the
attorney's fee for such representation may be taxed as
a cost of the action.
1868
30-3-12.

C o u r t s to exercise family counseling
powers.
Each district court of the respective judicial districts, while sitting in matters of divorce, annulment,
separate maintenance, child custody, alimony and
support in connection therewith, child custody in habeas corpus proceedings, and adoptions, shall exercise
the family counseling powers conferred by this act
IMS

30-3-13.

Repealed.

mi

30-3-13.1.

E s t a b l i s h m e n t of family c o u r t division of district c o u r t .
A family court division of the district court may be
established with the consent of the county cpmmiasion in a county in which the district court determines that the social conditions in the county and the
number of domestic relations cases in the courts require use of the procedures provided for in this act in
order to give full and proper consideration to such
cases and to effectual the purposes of this act. The
determination shall be made annually by the judge of
iha district court in counties having only one judge,
and by a majority of the judges of the district court in
counties having more than one judge.
issw
30-3-14. Repealed.

;t*»

30-3-14.1. Designation of j u d g e s — T e r m s .
In a county within a judicial district having more
than one judge of the district court but having a population of leas than 300,000 and in which the district
court has established a family court division, the pre-
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siding judge of audi court shall annually, in the
month of September, designate at least one judge to
hear all cases under this act. In a county within a
judicial district having more than one judge of the
district court and having a population of more than
300,000 and in which the district court has established a family court division, the presiding judge of
such court shall annually, in the month of September,
designate at least two judges to hear all cases under
this act, and shall designate one of such judges as the
presiding judge of such family court division. Such
judge or judges shall serve on the family court division not less than one year and devote their time
primarily to divorce and other domestic relations
cases,
i96s
30-3-15. Repealed.

issi

30-3-15,1. A p p o i n t m e n t of domestic relations
counselors, family c o u r t commissioner, a n d a s s i s t a n t s a n d clerks.
In each county having a population of less than
300,000 and in which the district court has established a family court division the district court judge
or judges may, and in each county having a population of more than 300,000 and in which the district
court has established a family court division the district court judges shall, by an order filed in the office
of the clerk on or before July 1 of each yoar, appoint
one or more domestic relations counselors, an attorney of recognized ability and standing at the bar as
family court commissioner, and such other persons as
assistants and clerks as may be necessary, to serve
during the pleasure of the appointing power.
im»
30-3-15.2. Domestic r e l a t i o n s c o u n s e l o r s —
Powers.
Domestic relations counselors shall have the power
to;
(1) Hold conciliation conferences with persona
who are parties to a petition for conciliation and
with parties in actions for divorce, annulment or
separate maintenance who may be referred by
the court in such actions.
(2) Test and evaluate all persons coming before them and either hold further conferences
with them or refer them to agencies or resources
for further conferences and counseling. Domestic
relations counselors shall report to the court on
each case referred, advising as to the number of
conferences attended by the parties and whether
a reconciiiulion has been or is likely to be effected.
(3) Conduct investigations and make reports
as the court may direct regarding the award of
custody or placement of children, either in predivorce or post-divorce matters. When a request
for an investigation has been joined in or agreed
to by both parties a report ahull be filed with the
court and received as evidence, subject to the
right of either party to cross-examine the person
making the report.
(4) Keep records, compile statistics and make
reports as the court may direct.
iyes
30-3-15.3. Commissioners — P o w e r s .
Family court commissioners shall have power to:
(1) Secure compliance with court orders.
(2) Serve as judge pro tempore, master or referee on assignment of the court, and with the
written consent of the parties to hear orders to
show cause where no contempt is alleged, default
divorces where the parties huve had marriage
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counseling but there has been no reconciliation,
uncontested actions under the Uniform Act on
Puternity, actions under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act and actions under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
(3) Represent the interest of children in divorce or annulment actions, and of the parties in
appropriate cases.
(4) Act with the domestic relations counselors
in the screening and referral of applicants for
counseling.
(5) Assist the domestic relations counselors in
custody investigations and the presentation,
where necessary, of their reports to the court.
1868

30-3-15.4. S a l a r i e s a n d e x p e n s e s .
Salaries of persons appointed under the foregoing
sections shall be fixed by the board of commissioners
of the county in which they serve. Office space, furnishings, equipment and supplies for family court
commissioners and conciliation staff shall be provided by the board of county commissioners. The expenses and salaries of family court commissioners
and conciliation staff shall be paid from county funds
under Section 17-16-7.
18S8
30-3-16.

Repealed.

iwn

30-3-16.1.

J u r i s d i c t i o n of family c o u r t division
— Powers.
Whenever any controversy exists between spouses
which may, unless a reconciliation is achieved, result
m the dissolution or annulment of the marriage or in
the disruption of the household, and there is a child of
the spouses or either of them under the age of 17
years whose welfare might be affected, the family
court division of the district court shall have jurisdiction over the controversy, over the parties and over
all persons having any relation to the controversy
and may compel attendance before the court or a domestic relations counselor of the parties or other persons related to the controversy. The court may make
orders in divorce or conciliation proceeding as it
deems necessary for the protection of the family interests.
18S8
30-3-16.2. Petition for conciliation.
Prior to the filing of any action for divorce, annulment, or separate maintenance, either spouse or both
spouses may file a petition for conciliation in the family court division invoking the jurisdiction of the
court for the purpose of preserving the marriage by
effecting a reconciliation between the parties or an
amicable settlement of the controversy between them
so as to avoid litigation over the issues involved, isae
30-3-16.3. C o n t e n t s of petition.
The petition for conciliation shall state:
(1) A controversy exists between the spouses
and request the aid of the court to effect a reconciliation or an amicable settlement of the controversy.
(2) The name and age of each child under the
age of 17 years whose welfare may be affected by
the controversy, .
* (3) The name and address of the petitioner or
the names and addresses of the petitioners.
(4) If the petition is filed by one spouse only,
the name and address of the other spouse as a
respondent.
(5) The name, as a respondent, of any other
person who has any relation to the controvert
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and, if known to the peuuoners, the address «
such person.
(6) Such other information as the court may \,
rule require.
i&
30-3-16.4. P r o c e d u r e u p o n filing of petition.
When a petition for conciliation is filed in the fan
ily court division of the district court, the court shu
refer the matter to the domestic relations counsel
or counselors and shall cause notice to be given to tl
spouses, by mail or in a form prescribed by the com
of the filing of the petition and of the time and pie.
of any hearing, conference or other proceeding sche<
uled by the court or domestic relations counselors vn
der this act.
10
30-3-16.5. Fees.
The court may fix fees to be charged for filing
petition for conciliation and for use of the couri
counseling services.
it>
30-3-16.6. Information n o t available to publi.
Neither the names of petitioners nor respondent
nor the contents of petitions for conciliation filed u
der this act, shall be available or open to public i
quiry, except that an attorney for a person seeking
file an action for divorce, annulment or separa
maintenance may determine from the clerk of tl
court if the other spouse has filed a petition for cone
iution.
iu
30-3-16.7. Effect of petition — P e n d e n c y of a
tion.
The filing of a petition for conciliation under th
act shall, for a period of 60 days thereafter, act as
bar to the filing by either spouse of an action for c
vorce, annulment of marriage or separate main!
nance unless the court otherwise orders. The pudency of an action for divorce, annulment of marriu,
or separate maintenance shall not prevent eilh
party to the action from filing a petition for concih
tion under this act, either on his own or at the ruqu*.
ancf direction of the court as authorized by Sectu
30-3-17; and the filing of a petition for conciliate
shall stay for a period of 60 days, unless the con
otherwise orders, any trial or default hearing up<
the complaint. However, when the judge of the fami
court division is advised in writing by a marria?
counselor to whom a petition for conciliation has be«
referred that a reconciliation of the parties cannot i
effected, the bar to filing an action or the stay of i n
or default hearing shall be removed.
.
n.
30-3-17. P o w e r a n d jurisdiction of j u d g e .
The judge of a district court may counsel eith
spouse or both and may in his discretion require QI
or both of them to appear before him and, in thu
counties where a domestic relations counselor h
been appointed pursuant to this act, require them
file a petition for conciliation and to appear befu
such counselor, or may recommend the aid of a phyi
cian, psychiatrist, psychologist, social service work
or other specialists or scientific expert, or the p$u$U
bishop or presiding officer of any religious denomin
tion to which the parties may belong. The power at
jurisdiction granted by this act shall bo in addition
that presently exercised by the district courts ai
shall not be in limitation thereof.
it>
30-3-17.1. P r o c e e d i n g s d e e m e d confidential
Written evaluation by counselor.
The petition for conciliation and all communic
tions, verbal or written, from the parties to the ti
meatic relations counselors or other personnel of ti
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37* ' Agreement to p a y c o m p e n s a t i o n to r e <cov«r reported property unenforceable.
lgreements to pay compensation to recover or
in the recovery of property reported under Sec^-44-18, made within 24 months after the date
nt or delivery is made under Section 78-44-20,
enforceable.
1983
t8. P r o p e r t y in foreign c o u n t r y o r from
foreign t r a n s a c t i o n e x e m p t .
chapter does not apply to any property held in
,*n country and arising out of a foreign transac-

Section
78-45-7.6
78-45-7.7.
78-45-7.8.
78-45-7.9.
78-45-7.10.
78-45-7.11.
78-45-7.12
78-45-7.13.
78-45-7.14
78-45-7.15.

1983

19. Duties u n d e r p r i o r l a w — P r o p e r t y to
be i n c l u d e d i n initial r e p o r t .
his chapter does not relieve a holder of a duty
rt, pay, or deliver property arising before July
\ Such holder who fails to comply before that
subject to the applicable enforcement and penovisions in existence at t h a t time and those
ons are continued in effect for the purpose of
ibsection, subject to Subsection 78-44-30(2).
I'he initial report to be filed under this chapter
perty that was not required to be reported be»ly 1, 1983, but which is subject to this chapter
nclude all items of property that would have
resumed abandoned during the ten-year period
o July 1, 1983, as if this chapter had been in
luring that period.
1983
tO. Application a n d c o n s t r u c t i o n of c h a p ter.
chapter shall be applied and construed as to
•ite its general purpose to make uniform the
Ih respect to the subject of this chapter among
- nactmg it.
1983
C H A P T E R 45
)RM C I V I L LIABILITY F O k
ACT
I.
i.
*.
1.
l 1.

S-.PPUR"

Short title.
Definitions.
Duty of man.
Duty of woman
Duty of stepparent to support stepchild
— Effect of termination of marriage or
common law relationship.
* 2. Natural or adoptive parent has primary
obligation of support — Right of atepparent to recover support.
I 3. Ward of state — Primary obligation to
support.
r
>.
Duty of obligor regardless of presence or
residence of obligee,
fj.
District court jurisdiction
7.
Determination of amount of support —
Rebuttable guidelines.
7.1. Medical and dental expenses of dependent children — Assigning rpqpnnubility for payment — Insurance coverage
7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal
7.3. Procedure — Documentation — Stipulation.
7 4, Obligation — Adjusted gross income
used.
7 fi Determination of «ross income — 1«*
puted income.

78-45-7.16.
"8-45-7.17.
78-45-7.18.
78-45-8.
78-45-9.
78-45-9.1.
78-45-9.2.
78-45-10.
78-45-11
78-45-12.
78-45-13
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Adjusted gross income.
Calculation of obligations.
Split custody — Obligation calculations.
Joint physical custody — Obligation calculations.
Reduction when child becomes 18.
Reduction for extended visitation.
Income in excess of tables.
Advisory committee — Membership and
functions.
Child support obligation table.
Medical and dental expenses — Insurance.
^
Uninsured extraordinary expenses —
Expenses not incurred.
Child care costs.
Limitation on amount of support ordered.
Continuing jurisdiction.
Enforcement of right of support.
Repealed.
County attorney to assist obligee.
Appeals.
Husband and wife privileged communication inapplicable — Competency of
spouses.
Rights are in addition to those presently
existing.
Interpretation and construction

78-45-1. S h o r t title.
This act may be cited as the Uniform Civil Liability
for Support Act.
1957
78-45-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Adjusted gross income" means income calculated under Subsection 78-45-7 6(1)
(2) "Base child support award" means the
award calculated using the guidelines before additions for uninsured extraordinary medical expenses and work-related child care costs.
(3) "Base combined child support obligation table," "child support table," or "table" means the
table in Section 78-45-7 14.
(4) "Child" means a son or daughter under the
age of 18 years and a son or daughter of whatever
age who is incapacitated from earning a living
and without sufficient means.
(5) "Earnings" means compensation paid or
payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or
otherwise, and specifically include periodic payment pursuant to pension or retirement programs, or insurance policies of any type. Earnings shall specifically include all gain derived
from capital, from labor, or from both combined,
including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital assets.
(6) "Extraordinary medical expense" includes
medical and dental expenses for surgery, orthodontic care, psychological or psychiatric care,
hospitalization, physical therapy, opthalmology
and optometry, broken limbs, and continuing illnesses or allergies such as diabetes or asthma.
(7) "Guidelines" means the child support
guidelines in Sections 78-45-7.2
through
78-45-7.18.
(8) "Joint physical custody" means the child
ptays with each parent overnight for more than
25% of the year, and both parents contribute to
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the expenses of the child in addition to paying
child support.
(9) "Obligee" means any person to whom a
duty of support is owed
(10) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty
of support.
(11) "Parent" includes a natural parent, an
adoptive parent, or a stepparent.
(12) "Split custody" means that each parent
has physical custody of at least one of the children.
(13) "State" includes any state, territory or
possession of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico.
(14) "Stepchild" means any child with a stepparent.
(15) "Stepparent" means a person ceremonially married to a child's natural or adoptive custodial parent who is not the child's natural or
adoptive parent or one living with the natural or
adoptive parent as a common law spouse, whose
common law marriage was entered into in a state
which recognizes the validity of common law
marriages.
(16) "Total child support award" means the
base child support award, plus any uninsured extraordinary medical expenses and child care
costs that may be ordered.
(17) "Work-related child care costs" means
reasonable child care costs for up to a full-time
work week or training schedule, necessitated by
the employment or training of the custodial parent, as provided in Section 78-45-7.17.
1989
78-45-3. D u t y of m a n .
Every man shall support his child; and he shall
support his wife when she is in need.
1977
78-45-4. Duty of w o m a n .
Every woman shall support her child, ana she shall
support her husband when he is in need
1957
78-45-4.1.

D u t y of s t e p p a r e n t to s u p p o r t stepchild — Effect of t e r m i n a t i o n of m a r riage or common law relationship.
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same
extent that a natural or adoptive parent is required to
support a child. Provided, however, that upon the termination of the marriage or common law relationship
between the stepparent and the child's natural or
adoptive parent the support obligation shall terminate.
1980
78-45-4.2. N a t u r a l o r a d o p t i v e p a r e n t h a s prim a r y obligation of s u p p o r t — R i g h t of
s t e p p a r e n t to r e c o v e r s u p p o r t .
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the
natural parent or adoptive parent of the primary obligation of support, furthermore, a stepparent has the
same right to recover support for a stepchild from the
natural or adoptive parent as any other obligee. 1979
78-45-4.3.

Ward of s t a t e — P r i m a r y obligation to
support.
Notwithstanding Section 78-45-2, a natural or an
adoptive parent or stepparent whose minor child has
become a ward of the state is not relieved of the primary obligation to support that child until he reaches
the age of majority.
1983
78-45-5.

Duty of obligor r e g a r d l e s s of p r e s e n c e
o r r e s i d e n c e of obligee.

78-43-7.^

An obligor present or resident in this state ha? th*duty of support as defined in this act regardless of the
presence or residence of the obligee.
195?
78-45-6. District c o u r t j u r i s d i c t i o n .
The district court shall have jurisdiction of ail proceedings brought under this act.
195?
78-45-7.

D e t e r m i n a t i o n of a m o u n t of s u p p o r t —
R e b u t t a b l e guidelines.
(1) Prospective support shall be pqual to th^
i m o u n t granted by prior court order unless there has
been a material change of circumstance on the part of
the obligor or obligee.
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material
change in circumstances has occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shal*
require each party to file a proposed award of child
support using the guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing award may
be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut
the guidelines, the court shall establish support after
considering all relevant factors including but not limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the
parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn.
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn,
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and
the child;
(0 the ages of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the sup- t
port of others.
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court
shall determine and assess all arrearages based upon,
but not limited to
(a) the amount of public assistance received by
the obligee, if any; and
(b) the funds t h a t have been reasonably and
necessarily expended in support of spouse and
children.
1989
-» 45-7.1.

Medical a n d d e n t a l e x p e n s e s of d e p e n d e n t c h i l d r e n — Assigning r e s p o n sibility for p a y m e n t — I n s u r a n c e coverage.
When no prior court order exists or the prior court
order makes no specific provision for the payment of
medical and dental expenses for dependent children,
the court shall include in its order a provision assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses for the dependent children If coverage is available at a reasonable
cost, the court may also include a provision requiring
the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health,
hospital, and dental care insurance for those children
1984

78-45-7.2. A p p l i c a t i o n of guidelines — R e b u t t a l .
(1) (a) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing or modifying an
award of child support entered on or after July 1,
1989.
(b) Neither the enactment of the guidelines or
any consequent impact of the guidelines on existing child support orders constitute a substantial
or material change of circumstances as a ground
for modification of a court order existing prior to
July 1, 1989. However, if the the court finds a
material change of circumstances independent of

78-45-7,8
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»rf the guidelines, the guidelines may be applied to
f
modify a court order existing prior to July 1,
1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing
or modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support,
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the guidelines and the award amounts resulting from the
application of the guidelines are presumed to be
correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of
this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the
record supporting the conclusion that complying with
a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award
amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be
unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a
child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the
presumption in that case.
(4) (a) A noncustodial parent's obligation to pro
vide child support for natural born or adopted
children of a second family arising subsequent to
entry of an existing child support order may not
be considered to lower the child support awarded
to the first family in the existing order.
(b) If the custodial parent of the first family
petitions to increase child support, all natural
born and adopted children of the noncustodial
parent may be considered in determining
whether to increase the award.
u»sf»
78-45-7.3,

P r o c e d u r e — D o c u m e n t a t i o n — Stiff
ulation.
(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, tl•«moving party shall submit:
(a) a completed child support worksheet;
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and
(c) an affidavit indicating that the amount of
child support requested is consistent with th*»
guidelines, or that the amount is not consistent
with the guidelines.
-w
(2) (a) If the documental ion of income required under Subsection (J) is not available, a verified representation of the defaulting party's income by
the moving party, based on the best evidence
available, may be submitted.
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and
may only be offered after a copy has been pro
vided to the defaulting party in accordance with
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(3) (a) If a stipulation is submitted as a basis for
establishing or modifying child support, each
parent shall present financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(4) and an affidavit fully disclosing the financial status of each
parent, as required for use of the guidelines. A
hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall
be used to review the adequacy of a child support
order negotiated by the parents.
(b) A stipulated amount for child support or
combined child support and alimony is adequate
under the guidelines if the stipulated child support amount or combined amount exceeds the
total child support award required by the guidelines. When the stipulated amount exceeds the
guidelines, it may be awarded without a finding
under Section 78-45-7.2.
IPS9
8-46-7.4.

Obligation
used.

Adjusted g r o s s i n c o m e

CuuE

39<

Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating
each parent's share of the child support award. Onlj
income of the natural or adoptive parents of the chile
may be used to determine the award under these
guidelines.
\m
78-45-7.5.

D e t e r m i n a t i o n of g r o s s i n c o m e — Imputed i n c o m e .
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions,
royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone,
prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social security
benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, disability insurance
benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested"
government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited
to the equivalent of one full-time job.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy
program, the Job Training Partnership Act,
S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits
received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated by
subtracting necessary expenses required for selfemployment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross
income available to the parent to satisfy a child
support award. Only those expenses necessary to
allow the business to operate at a reasonable
level may be deducted from gross receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of business
income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be
computed on an annual basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earnings, including year-todate pay stubs or employer statements. Each parent shall supplement documentation of current
earnings with copies of tax returns from at least
the most recent year to provide verification of
earnings over time and shall document income
from nonearned sources according to the source.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be
used to determine whether an underemployment
or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the
parent under Subsection (7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed
or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) Income shall be imputed to a parent based
upon employment potential and probable earnings as derivea from work history, occupation
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qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a forty-hour work week. To impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of
fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the
following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for
the parents' minor children approach or
equal the amount of income the custodial
parent can earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he cannot earn minimum
wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills,
or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs
of a child require the custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may. not include the earnings
of a child who is the subject of a child support
award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right, such as Supplemental Security Income.
<b) Social Security benefits received by a child
due to the earnings of a parent may be credited
as child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the amount
against the potential obligation of that parent.
Other unearned income of a child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the
circumstances of each case.
IBSB
78-45-7.6. A d j u s t e d g r o s s i n c o m e .
(1) As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross income" is the amount calculated by subtracting from
^ross income alimony previously ordered and paid
md child support previously ordered.
(2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child
upport award by adjusting the gross incomes of the
>arents for alimony ordered in the pending proceedng. In establishing alimony, the court shall consider
hat in determining the child support, the guidelines
o not provide a deduction from gross income for alilony.

1989

8-45-7.7. C a l c u l a t i o n of o b l i g a t i o n s .
(1) The parents* child support obligation shall be
ivided between them in proportion to their aajusted
ross incomes.
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and
)!it custody as d<4fined in Section 78-45-2, the total
lild support award shall be determined as follows:
(a) combine the adjusted gross incomes of the
parents and determine the base combined child
support obligation using the base child support
obligation table;
(b) calculate each parent's proportionate share
of the base combined child support obligation by
multiplying the combined child support obligation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income, and subtracting from the
products the children's portion of any monthly
payments made directly by each parent for medical and dental insurance premiums;

78-45-7.:

(c) allocate any known uninsured extraordi
nary medical expenses to be incurred on behalf o'
the children equally to each parent;
(d) after subtracting federal tax credits, alio
cate monthly work-related child care cost
equally to each parent;
(e) calculate the total child support award lv
adding the noncustodial parent's share o( th<
base child support obligation calculated in Sub
section (2Kb) and the two amounts allocated b
Subsections (2)(c) and (d); and include in the oi
der all three amounts and the total child suppor'
award.
(3) The base combined child support obligation tn
ble provides" combined child support obligations for ui
to six children. For more than six children, ndditionn
amounts shall be added to the base child support obit
gation shown. The amount shown on the table is th<
support amount for the total number of children, n<>
an amount per child.
19*»
78-45-7.8.

Split c u s t o d y — Obligation calculations.
In cases of split custody, the total child supp«"
award shall be determined as follows:
(1) Combine the aajusted gross incomes of th
parents and determine the base combined chil<
support obligation using the base child suppoi
obligation table. Allocate a portion of the calcn
lated amount between the parents in proportim
to the number of children for whom ench pnren'
has physical custody. The amounts so calculate"
are a tentative base child support obligation du
each parent from the other parent for support c>
the child or children for whom each parent ha
physical custody.
(2) Multiply the tentative base child suppor'
obligation due each parent by the percentag<
that the other parent's adjusted gross incombears to the total combined adjusted gross incom*
of both parents.
'3) Subtract from the products in Subsection
(2? the children's portion of any monthly pay
merits made directly by each parent for modioli
and dental insurance premiums.
(4) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection
(3) from the larger amount to determine the bas«
child support award to be paid by the parent with
the greater financial obligation.
(5) Allocate any known uninsured extraordi
nary medical expenses to be incurred on behalf o<
the children equally to each parent.
(6) After subtracting federal tax credits, alio
cate combined monthly work-related child can
costs equally to each parent.
(7) Calculate the total child support award b\
adding the base child support award calculated
in Subsection (4) and the amounts allocated iiSubsections <5) and ((>). Include all three amount
and the total child support award in the chil«l
support order.
imv
78-45-7.9. J o i n t physical c u s t o d y — Obligation
calculations.
In cases of joint physical custody, the total child
support award shall be determined as follows:
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of thparents and determine the base combined chil<
support obligation using the base child suppoi
obligation table.
(2) Calculate each parent's proportional*
share of the base combined child support obliga
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< tion by multiplying the combined child support
*}•* '-obligation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income. The amounts so cal* culated are a tentative base child support obligation due from each parent for support of the children.
'
(3) Multiply each parent's tentative base child
» support obligation by the percentage of time the
children spend with the other parent to determine each parent's tentative obligation to the
other parent.
(4) Subtract from the products in Subsection
(3) the children's portion of any monthly payments made directly by each parent for medical
and dental insurance premiums.
(5) Calculate the base child support award to
be paid by the obligor by subtracting the lesser
amount calculated in Subsection (4) from the
larger amount.
(6) Allocate any known uninsured extraordinary medical expenses to be incurred on behalf of
the children equally to each parent.
(7) After subtracting federal tax credits, allocate the combined work-related child care costs of
the parents equally to each parent to obtain the
other parent's tentative child care obligation.
(8) (a) Calculate the total child support award
that the parent determined to be the obligor
in Subsection (5) must pay when the obligee
has physical custody by:
(i) adding the base child support
award calculated under Subsection (5);
(ii) adding the amount of known uninsured extraordinary medical expenses
allocated to the obligor in Subsection (6);
and
(iii) adding the amount of the child
care obligation allocated to the obligor
in Subsection (7).
(b) Calculate the total child support award
that the parent determined to be the obligor
in Subsection (5) must pay when that parent
has physical custody by:
(i) adding the base child support
award calculated under Subsection (5);
(ii) adding the amount of the known
uninsured extraordinary medical expenses allocated to the obligor in Subsection (6); and
(iii) subtracting the amount of the
child care obligation allocated to the obligee in Subsection (7).
(9) Include the amounts determined in Subsections (8)(a) and (8Kb) and the two total child support awards in the child support order.
1989
78-45-7.10. Reduction w h e n child b e c o m e s 18.
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age the base
combined child support award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower base combined child support obligation shown in the table for the remaining
number of children due child support, unless otherwise provided in the child support order.
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child
amount derived from the base child support award
originally ordered.
less
78-45-7.11. Reduction for e x t e n d e d visitation.
(I) The child support order shall provide that the
base child support award be reduced by 50% for each
child for time periods during which specific extended
visitation for that child is granted in the order for at
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least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. Only the base
child support award is affected by the 50% abatement. The amount added to the base child support
award for uninsured extraordinary medical expenses
may continue uninterrupted. The amount to be paid
for work-related child care costs may be suspended if
the costs are not incurred during the extended visitation.
(2) For purposes of this section the per child
amount to which the abatement applies shall be calculated by dividing the base child support award by
the number of children included in the award.
1989
78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables. ,^
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the
highest level specified in the table, an appropriate
and just child support amount may be ordered, but
the amount ordered may not be less than the highest
level specified in the table for the number of children
due support.
1989
78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership
and functions.
(1) On or before May 1, 1989 and May 1, 1991, and
then on or before May 1 of every fourth year subsequently, the governor shall appoint an advisory committee consisting of:
(a) two representatives recommended by the
Office of Recovery Services;
(b) two representatives recommended by the
Judicial Council;
(c) two representatives recommended by the
Utah State Bar Association; and
(d) an uneven number of additional persons,
not to exceed five, who represent diverse interests related to child support issues, as the governor may consider appropriate. However, none of
the individuals appointed under this subsection
may be members of the Utah State Bar Association.
(2) (a) The advisory committee shall review the
child support guidelines to ensure their application results in the determination of appropriate
child support award amounts.
(b) The committee shall report to the Legislative Judiciary Interim Committee on or before
October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or before October 1 of every fourth year subsequently.
(c) The committee*8 report shall include recommendations of the majority of the committee, as
well as specific recommendations of individual
members of the committee.
(3) The committee members serve without compensation. Staff for the committee shall be provided from
the existing budgets of the Department of Social Services and the Judicial Council. The committee ceases
to exist no later than the date the subsequent committee under this section is appointed.
1989
78-45-7.14. Child s u p p o r t obligation table.
The following is the Base Combined Child Support
Obligation Table:
BASE COMBINED CHILD SUPPORT
OBLIGATION
(Both Parents)
(Adjusted for FICA, and federal and state taxes)
Combined
Adj. Gross
Income
1

2

$20
23

$28
34

Children
3
4

5

6

$32
36

$33
36

Less
than $200
200

$30
35

$31
35
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(97
ombined
dj. Grows
icome
$ 225
250
275
300
325
350
375
400
425
450
475
500
525
550575
600
625
650
675
700
725
750
775
800
825
850
875
900
925
950
975
1.000
1,050
1,100
1.150
1,200
1.250
1.300
1.350
1.400
1.450
1.500
1.550
1.600
1.650
1.700
1.750
1.8(H)
1.850
1.900
1.950
2,000
2.100
2.200
2.300
2.400
2.500
2,600
2.700
2.800
2,900
3.000
3,100
3.200
3.300
3.400
3.500
3.600
3.700
3.800
3.900
4,000
4.100
4.200
4.300
4.400
4.500
4.§00
4.700
4,800
4.900
5,000
5.100
5.200
5.300
5.400
5.500
5,600

Combined
Adj. Gross
Income

Children
1

2

25
28
51
56
60
65
69
74
78
83
87
02
96
100
105
109
114
118
123
127

38
42
67
73
78
84
90
96
102
108
114
120
126
131
137
143
149
155
161
167
173
178
184
190
214
220
226
232
238
244
250
256
268
280
292
296
304
312
320
328
336
345
353
361
369
377
385
393
408
416
423
418
432
447
461
476
482
497
511
532
547
562
577
592
607
622
637
653
668
683
706
720
735
749
764
778
802
816
831
845
860
874
889
903
939
951
963
976

1.12

136
Ml
145
167
168
169
171
172
173
174
176
178
181
183 '
180
185
190
195
200
205
210
215
219
224
229
234
239
252
256
259
251
259
267
275
283
282
290
298
313
321
330
339
348
357
366
375
384
393
402
419
427
435
443
451
459
477
485
493
501
609
517
525
534
564
570
577
583

3
39
43
67
73
79
85
91
97
103
109
115
121
127
133
139
145
151
157
162
168
174
180
186
192
218
229
241
252
263
275
286
298
321
344
367
379
390
400
410
421
431
441
452
462
473
483
493
504
522
532
541
538
557
576
595
614
625
644
663
689
708
728
747
766
786
805
824
844
863
882
909
928
947
966
985
1.004
1.032
1,050
1,069
1,088
1,107
1.126
1,145
1,164
1,203
1.220
1.236
1,252
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4
39
43
68
74
80
86
92
98
104
110
116
122
128
134
140
146
152
158
164
170
176
182
188
194
220
233
245
258
270.
283
295
308
333
358
383
399
413
428
442
457 ,

471
486
501
515
530
544
659
574
695
606
617
616
637
659
680
702
715
737
7*8
787
809
831
863
875
897
920
942
964
986
1.008
1.038
1.060
1,082

1,103
1.125
1.147
1.177
1.199
1.221
1.243
1,264
1.286
1,308
1.329
1,372
1.391
1,410
1.429

5
40
44
69
75
81
87
93
99
105
111
117
123
129
135
141
148
154
160
166
172
178
184
190
196
222
235
247
260
273
285
298
311
336
362
387
404
423
441
460
479
497
516
535
554
572
591
610
628
654
665
677
677
701
725
749
772
788
812
836
866
890
915
939
963
988
1,012
1.036
1,061
1,085
1,109
1.142
1.166
1.190
1,214
1,238
1.262
1,295
1.319
1.343
1.367
1,391
1,415
1.439
1.463
1,508
1,529
1,550
1,571

6
40
45
69
76
82
88
94
100
106
112
118
125
131
137
143
149
155
161
167
174
180
186
192
198
224
237
250
263
276
288
301
314
340
366
392
410
432
454
476
498
520
542
564
586
608
630
652
674
702
715
728
728
754
780
805
831
849
875
900
932
959
985
1,011
1,037
1.063
1,089
1,115
1.142
1.168
1.194
1.228
1.254
1.280
1.306
1,332
1,358
1,393
1.419
1.445
1.471
1.497
1.523
1,549
1,575
1.621
1.644
1.666
1,689

$ 5,700
5.800
5.900
6,000
6.100
6.200
6,300
6.400
6.500
6.600
6.700
6.800
6.900
7.000
7,100
7.200
7.300
7.400
7.500
7.600
7.700
7.800
7.900
8.000
8.100
8.200
8.300
8.400
8.500
8,600
8.700
8,800
8,900
9.000
9.100
9,200
9.300
9.400
9,500
9.600
9.700
9.800
9.900
10.000

Children
1

2

3

4

5

6

590
596
603
609
616
622
630
637
651
658
665
673
680
687
694
701
706
710
715
719
723
728

988
1,001
1.013
1.025
1.038
1.050
1.062
1.075
1.094
1.107
1.119
1.M2
1.144
1.157
1.169
1,181
1.189
1.197
1,205
1.213
1.220
1.228
1,236
1.244
1.252
1.259
1.267
1.275
1.283
1.291
1.298
1,306
1.314
1.322
1.330
1.337
1.345
1.353
1.361
1.369
1.376
1.384
1.392
1.400

1.269
1.285
1.302
1,318
1.334
1,351
1.367
1.383
1.407
1.423

1.448
1.467
1.485

1.592
1.613
1.634

1.504
1.523
1.542
1.561

1.655
1.676
1.697
1.718
1.739
1.766
3.787
I.SOS
1.828
1,849
1.870
1.890
1.911
1.923
1.936
1.949
1.962
1.975
1.9S7
2.0(H)
2.013
2.026
2.039
2.052
2.064
2.077

1.712
1.734
1.757
1.780

7.12

737
741
746
750
755
759
763
768
772
777
781
786
790
795
799
803
808
812
817
821
826

1.4.19
1.455
1.472
1.488
1.504
1,520
1.531
1.541
1,551
1.562
1.572
1.582
1.592
1.603
1.613
1,623
1.633
1.644
1.654
1,664
1,675
1.685
1.695
1,705
1.716
1.726
1.736
1.747
1,757
1.767
1,777
1.788
1,798
1.808

1,580
1.606
1.624
1.643
1.662
1.6HI
1.699
1,718
1.736
1.748
1.760
1.771
1.78.1
1.794
1.806
1.818
1.829
1.841
1.853
1.864
1.876
1.887
1.899
1.911
1.922
1,934
1,945
1.957
1,969
1.980
1.992
2.003
2.015
2.027
2.038
2.050
2.061

2.090
2.103
2.116
2,129
2.141
2.154
2.167
2.180
2.193
2.2f>6
2.218
2.231
2.244
2.257
2.270

1.802
1.825
1.847
1.869
1.899
1.921
1.943
1.965
1.987
2.010
2.032
2.054
2.067
2.081
2.095
2.109
2.123
2.137
2.150
2.164
2.178
2.192
2.206
2.220
2.234
2.247
2.261
2,275
2.2«9
2.303
2.317
2.330
2,344
2.358
2.372
2.386
2.400*
2.414 2.427
2.441
1989

78-45-7.15. Medical a n d d e n t a l e x p e n s e s — Insurance.
(1) Only the costs of health and dental insurance
premiums for children are included in the base combined child support obligation table.
(2) Uninsured medical and dental expenses are not
included in the table. The child support order shall
require:
(a) the custodial parent to pay uninsured routine medical and dental expenses, including routine office visits, physical examinations, and immunizations; and
(b) both parents to share equally all other reasonable and necessary uninsured medical and
dental expenses.
(3) (a) If health insurance is available to both parents at a reasonable cost and the children would
gain more complete coverage by doing so, both
parents shall be ordered to maintain insurance
for the dependent children.
(b) If insurance is not available to both parents
at a reasonable cost or if no advantage to the
children's coverage would result, the parent who
can obtain the most favorable coverage shall be
ordered to maintain that insurance.
198»
78-45-7.16. U n i n s u r e d e x t r a o r d i n a r y e x p e n s e s
— E x p e n s e s not i n c u r r e d .
(1) (a) The monthly amount of all known reasonable and necessary uninsured extraordinary
medical expenses and the monthly amount to be
paid in addition to the base child support award
for reasonable work-related child care costs actu-
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ally incurred on behalf of the dependent children
of the parents shall be specified as two separate
monthly amounts in the order
(b) If an actual expense included in an amount
specified in the order ceases to be incurred, the
obligor may suspend making monthly payment
of that expense while it is not being incurred,
without obtaining a modification of the child support order
(2) Unless the expenses described in Subsection (1)
are included in the child support order, or the parents
enter into a written agreement to share the expenses,
one parent may not obligate both parents to pay the
expenses
1989
78-45-7.17. Child c a r e costs.
(1) The need to include child care costs in the child
support order is presumed if the custodial parent is
working and actually incurring the child care costs
(2) The need to include child care costs is not presumed, but may be awarded on a case by case basis if
the costs are related to the career or occupational
training of the custodial parent
1989
78-45-7.18. Limitation o n a m o u n t of s u p p o r t ordered.
(1) There is no maximum limit on the base child
support award that may be ordered using the base
combined child support obligation table or for the
iward of uninsured extraordinary medical expenses
except under Subsection (2)
(2) If the combination of the two amounts under
Subsection (1) exceeds 50% of the obligor's aajusted
(,'ross income, or that by adding the child care costs,
'he total child support award would exceed 50% of the
obligor's adjusted gross income, the presumption unler Section 78-45-7 17 is rebutted
1989
78-45-8. C o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n .
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or va' ate the order of support where justice requires
1957
78-45-9. Enforcement of r i g h t of s u p p o r t .
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support
against the obligor, and the office may proceed
pursuant to this chapter or any other applicable
statute, either on behalf of the Department of
Social Services or any other department or
agency of this state that provides public assistance, as defined by Subsection f)2A 11-303(3), to
enforce the right to recover public assistance, or
on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the obligee's
right of support against the obligor
(b) Whenever any court action is commenced
by the office to enforce payment of the obligor's
support obligation, it shall be the duty of the attorney general or the county attorney of the
county of residence of the obligee to represent the
office
(2) (a) A person may not commence any action or
file a pleading to establish or modify a support
obligation or to recover support due or owing,
whether under this chapter or any other applicable statute, without filing an affidavit with the
court at the time the action is commenced or the
pleading is filed stating whether public assistance has been or is being provided on behalf of a
dependent child of the person commencing the
action or filing the pleading
(b) If public assistance has been or is being
provided, that person shall join the office as a
party to the action The office shall be represented as provided in Subsection (1Kb)

di*5

(3) As used in this section "office" means the Office
of Recovery Services within the Department of Social
Services
im»
78-45-9.1. Repealed.

I»M

78-45-9.2. County a t t o r n e y to assist obligee.
The county attorney's office shall provide assistance to an obligee desiring to proceed under this act
in the following manner
(1) provide forms, approved by the Judicial
Council of Utah, for an order of wage assignment
if the obligee is not represented by legal counsel,
(2) the county attorney's office may charge a
fee not to exceed $25 for providing assistance to
an obligee under Subsection (1)
(3) inform the obligee of the right to file lmpecuniously if the obligee is unable to bear the expenses of the action and assist the obligee with
such filing,
(4) advise the obligee of the available methods
for service of process, and
(5) assist the obligee in expeditiously scheduling a hearing before the court
1983
78-45-10. A p p e a l s .
Appeals may be taken from orders and judgments
under this act as in other civil actions
1957
78-45-11. H u s b a n d a n d wife privileged communication inapplicable — Competency
of spouses.
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure of
communications between husband and wife are inapplicable under this act Spouses are competent witnesses to testify to any relevant matter, including
marriage and parentage
1967
78-45-12. Rights a r e in addition to t h o s e presently existing.
The rights herein created are in addition to and not
in substitution to any other rights
1967
78-45-13. I n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d c o n s t r u c t i o n .
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the
law of those states which enact it
1067
C H A P T E R 45a
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY
Section
78-45a-l
78-45a-2
78-45a-3
78-45a 4
78-45a-5
78 45a-6
78-45a-6 5
78-45a-7
78-45a-8
78-45a-9
78-45a-10
78-45a-ll
78-45a-12
78-45a-13
78-45a-14
78-45a-15
78-45a-16
78-45a-17

Obligations of the father
Enforcement
Limitation on recovery from the father.
Limitations on recovery from father's estate
Remedies
Time of trial
Paternity action — Jury trial
Authority for blood tests
Selection of experts
Compensation of expert witnesses.
Effect of test results
Judgment
Security
Settlement agreements
Venue
Uniformity of interpretation.
Short title
Operation of act

78-45a-l. Obligations of t h e father.
The father of a child which is or may be born out of
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wedlock is liable to the same extent as the father of a
child born in wedlock, whether or not the child is
born alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother's
pregnancy and confinement and for the education,
necessary support and funeral expenses of the child
A child born out of wedlock includes a child born to a
married woman by a man other than her husband
1965

P8-45a-2
Enforcement.
Paternity may be determined upon the petition of
he mother, child, or the public authority chargeable
>y law with the support of the child If paternity has
een determined or has been acknowledged according
5 the laws of this state, the liabilities of the father
lay be enforced in the same or other proceedings
(1) by the mother child, or the public authority which have furnished or may furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses,
and
(2) by other persons including private agencies
to the extent that they have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses
1966

-45a-3.

Limitation on r e c o v e r y from t h e father.
The father's liability for past education and necessary support are limited to a period of four years next
preceding the commencement of an action
1965
78-45a-4.

Limitations on r e c o v e r y from father's
estate.
The obligation of the estate of the father for liabili
ties under this act are limited to amounts accrued
prior to his death and such sums as may be payable
for dependency under other laws
1965
78-45a-5. Remedies.
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action
under this act and all remedies for the enforcement of
judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confinement for a wife or for education, necessary support, or
funeral expenses for legitimate children apply The
court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke
a judgment for future education and necessary support All remedies under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, are available for enforcement of duties of support under this act
(2) The obligee may enforce his right of support
igamst the obligor and the state Department of Social Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee or
n its own behalf pursuant to the provisions of Chap
er 45b of this title to enforce that right of support
igainst the obligor In such actions by the departnent, ail the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title
shall be equally applicable to this chapter Whenever
a court action is commenced bv the state Department
of Social Services, it shall be the duty of the attorney
general or the county attorney, of the county of residence of the obligee, to represent that department
1975

78-45a-6. Time of trial.
If the issue of paternity is raised in action commenced during the pregnancy of the mother, the trial
shall not, without the consent of the alleged father, be
held until after the birth or miscarriage but during
such delay testimony may be perpetuated according
to the laws of this state
1965

78-45a-13

78-45a-6.5. P a t e r n i t y action — J u r y trial.
(1) Either party to an action commenced under this
chapter may demand a jury trial to determine paternity
(2) (a) The procedure and law governing a trial by
jury under this chapter is the same as for a civil
jury trial in district court
(b) The standard of proof is "by a preponder
ance of the evidence "
198S
78-45a-7. A u t h o r i t y for blood tests.
The court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf of any person whose blood
is involved may, or upon motion of any party to the
action made at a time so as not to delay the proceed
ings unduly, "hall order the mother, child and alleged
father to submit to blood tests If any party refuses to
submit to such tests the court may resolve the question of paternity against such party or enforce its order if the rights of others and the interests of justice
so require
iww
78-45a-8. Selection of e x p e r t s .
The tests shall be made by experts qualified as examiners of blood types who shall be appointed by the
court The experts shall be called by the court as witnesses to testify to their findings and shall be subject
to cross-examination by the parties Anv party or person at whose suggestion the tests have been ordered
may demand that other experts qualified as exam
mers of blood types, perform independent tests under
order of court, the results of which may be offered in
evidence The number and qualifications of such ex
perts shall be determined by the court
1965
78-45a-9. C o m p e n s a t i o n of e x p e r t witnesses.
The compensation of each expert witness appointed
by the court shall be fixed at a reasonable amount It
shall be paid as the court shall o t der The court may
order that it be paid by the parties in such propor
tions and at such times as it shall prescribe The fee
of an expert witness called by a party but not ap
pointed by the court shall be paid by the party calling
him but shall not be taxed as costs in the action 1965
78-45a-10. Effect of test results.
If the court finds that the conclusions of all experts,
as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests, are
that the alleged father is not the father of the child,
the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly If the experts disagree in their findings or conclusions, the question shall be submitted upon all the
evidence If the experts conclude that the blood tests
show the possibility of the alleged father's paternity,
admission of this evidence is within the discretion of
the court, depending upon the mfrequency of the
blood type

1965

78-45a-ll. J u d g m e n t .
Judgments under this act may be for periodic payments which may vary in amount The court may
order payments to be made to the mother or to some
person, corporation, or agency designated to administer them under the supervision of the cou rt
1965
78-45a-12. Security.
The court may require the alleged father to give
bond or other security for the payment of the judgment
1965
78-45a-13. Settlement a g r e e m e n t s .
An agreement of settlement with the alleged father
is binding only when approved by the court
1965
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T I T L E I. A P P L I C A B I L I T Y O F R U L E S .

RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS

R u l e 1. Scope of r u l e s .
(a) Applicability of r u l e s . These rules govern the
procedure before the Utah Court of Appeals in all
cases. When these rules provide for a motion or application to be made in a district, juvenile, or circuit
court or an administrative agency, commission, or
board, the procedure for making such motion or application shall be governed by the practice of the district, juvenile, or circuit court or the administrative
agency, commission, or board.
(b) Applicability of r u l e s to r e v i e w of j u v e n i l e
o r circuit court p r o c e e d i n g s . Whenever in these
rules reference is made to practice and procedure in
appeals or proceedings from an order or judgment of a
district court, said rules shall have equal application,
force, and effect with regard to practice and procedure
in appeals from orders or judgments from a juvenile
or circuit court.
(c) P r o c e d u r e e s t a b l i s h e d b y s t a t u t e . If a procedure is provided by state statute as to the appeal or
review of an order of an administrative agency, commission, or board or an officer of the state which is
inconsistent with one or more of these rules, the statute shall govern. In other respects, these rules shall
apply as to such appeals or reviews.
(d) Rules not to affect j u r i s d i c t i o n . These rules
shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as established by law.
(e) Title. These rules shall be known as the Rules
of the Utah Court of Appeals and abbreviated R.
Utah Ct. App.

TITLE I. APPLICABILITY OP RULES.
RULE

1. Scope of rules.
2. Suspension of rules.
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM J U D G M E N T S
AND ORDERS.

3. Appeal as of right: How taken.
4. Appeal as of right: When taken.
4A. Transfer of case from Supreme Court to Court of
Appeals.
4B. Certification by the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.
4C. Transfer of improperly pursued appeals.
5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders.
6. Bond for costs on appeal.
7. Security: Proceedings against sureties.
8. Stay or injunction pending appeal.
9. Docketing statement.
10. Motions for summary disposition.
11. The record on appeal.
12. Transmission of the record.
13. Notice of filing by clerk of Court of Appeals,
TITLE III. R E V I E W AND ENFORCEMENT OF
ORDERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES,
COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEES.

14. Review of administrative orders: How obtained;
intervention.
15. Record on review.
16. Filing of record.
17. Stay pending review.
18. Applicability of other rules to review.

R u l e 2. S u s p e n s i o n of r u l e s .
In the interest of expediting a decision, the Court of
Appeals, on its own motion or for extraordinary cause
shown, may, except as to the provisions of Rules 4(a),
4(e), and 5(a), suspend the requirements or provisions
of any of these rules in a particular case and may
order proceedings in that case in accordance with its
direction.

TITLE IV. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS;
HABEAS CORPUS.

19. Extraordinary writs.
20. Habeas corpus proceedings.
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS.

T I T L E II. A P P E A L S F R O M J U D G M E N T S
AND O R D E R S .

Filing and service.
Computation and enlargement of time.
Motions.
Briefs.
Brief of an amicus curiae.
Filing and service of briefs.
Form of briefs, petitions, motions, and other papers.
28. Prehearing conference.
29. Oral argument.
30. Decision of the court: Dismissal; notice of decision.
31. Expedited appeals decided after oral argument
without written opinion.
32. Interest on judgment.
33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney fees.
34. Award of costs.
35. Petition for rehearing.
36. Issuance of remittitur.
37. Suggestion of mootness; voluntary dismissal.
38. Substitution of parties.
39. Duties of the clerk.
Aft Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and
discipline.

R u l e 3. A p p e a l a s of right: H o w t a k e n .
(a) Filing a p p e a l from final o r d e r s a n d j u d g m e n t s . As defined and provided by law, an appeal
may be taken from the final orders and judgments of
a district court, juvenile court, or circuit court to the
Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the
clerk of the particular court from which the appeal is
taken within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of
an appellant to take any step other than the timely
filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity
of the appeal, but is a ground only for such action as
the Court of Appeals deems appropriate, which may
include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions
short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney
fees.
(b) J o i n t o r c o n s o l i d a t e d a p p e a l s . If two or more
parties are entitled to appeal from a judgment or an
order and their interests are such as to make joinder
practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or
join in an appeal of another party after filing separate
timely notices of appeal. Such joint appeals may
thereafter proceed and be treated as a single appeal
with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be
consolidated by order of the Court of Appeals on its

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
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own motion, on motion of a party, or by stipulation of
the parties to the separate appeals.
(c) D e s i g n a t i o n of p a r t i e s . The party taking the
appeal shall be known as the appellant and the adverse party as the respondent. The title of the action
or proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of
the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the
Court of Appeals. In original proceedings in the Court
of Appeals, the party making the original application
shall be known as the plaintiff and any other party as
the defendant.
(d) C o n t e n t of n o t i c e of a p p e a l . The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part
thereof, appealed from; shall name the court from
which the appeal is taken; and shall designate that
the appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals.
(e) S e r v i c e of n o t i c e of a p p e a l . The party taking
the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a notice of
appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order or, if the party is not represented by
counsel, to the party at the last known address of the
party.
(0 Filing a n d d o c k e t i n g fees in civil a p p e a l s .
At the time of filing any separate or joint notice of
appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal
shall pay to the clerk of the court from which the
appeal is taken such filing fees as are established by
law and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the
Court of Appeals. The clerk of the court from which
the appeal is taken shall not accept a notice of appeal
unless the filing and docketing fees are paid.
(g) D o c k e t i n g of a p p e a l . Upon the filing of the
notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the
clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken
shall forthwith transmit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, together with the
docketing fee, to the clerk of the Court of Appeals.
Upon receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal and
the docketing fee, the clerk of the Court of Appeals
shall thereupon enter the appeal upon the docket. An
appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the
action in the court from which the appeal is taken,
with the appellant identified as such, but if such title
does not contain the name of the appellant, such
name shall be added to the title.
R u l e 4. A p p e a l a s of right: W h e n t a k e n .
(a) A p p e a l from final j u d g m e n t a n d o r d e r . In a
case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of
right from the district court, juvenile court, or circuit
court to the Court of Appeals, the notice of appeal
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the
court from which the appeal is taken within 30 days
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) M o t i o n s p o s t j u d g m e n t o r o r d e r . If a timely
motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
filed by any party in an action in which the Court of
Appeals would have the power of direct review (1) for
judgment under Rule 50(b), (2) under Rule 52(b) to
amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or
not an alteration of the judgment would be required if
the motion is granted, (3) under Rule 59 to alter or
amend the judgment, or (4) under Rule 59 for a new
trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from
the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a
timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed by any party under Rule 24 for a new
trial or under Rule 26 for an order after judgment
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affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, t
time for appeal for all parties shall run from t
entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
denying any such motion under Rule 26. A notice
appeal filed before the disposition of any of the afcx.
motions shall have no effect. A new notice of app<
must be filed within the prescribed time measui
from the entry of the order of the district court, ju>
nile court, or circuit court disposing of the motion
provided above.
(c) Filing p r i o r to e n t r y of j u d g m e n t o r ord<
Except as provided in Paragraph (b) of this rulenotice of appeal filed after the announcement o»
decision, a judgment, or an order but before the em
of the judgment or order of the district court, juven
court, or circuit court shall be treated as filed a)
such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) A d d i t i o n a l o r c r o s s - a p p e a l . If a timely nol
of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may I
a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
which the first notice of appeal was filed or within t
time otherwise prescribed by Paragraph (a) of tt
rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) E x t e n s i o n of time to a p p e a l . The court fr<
which the appeal is taken, upon a showing of exc
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time
filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not la
than 30 days after the expiration of the time \>
scribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion
extend time that is filed before expiration of the \>
scribed time may be heard ex parte unless the cm
from which the appeal is taken requires otherwi
Notice of any such motion that is filed after the e>
ration of the prescribed time shall be given to i
other parties in accordance with the rules of pracl
of the court from which the appeal is taken. No ext>
sion shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed tirm
10 days from the date of entry of the order grand
the motion, whichever occurs later.
R u l e 4A. T r a n s f e r of c a s e from S u p r e m e Coi
t o C o u r t of A p p e a l s .
(a) D i s c r e t i o n of S u p r e m e C o u r t t o t r a n s f e r ,
any time before a case is set for oral argument bef
the Supreme Court, that court may transfer to i
Court of Appeals any case except those cases witi
the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction. Such
der of transfer shall be issued without opinion, wi
ten or oral, as to the merits of the appeal or the tsons for the transfer.
(b) Notice of o r d e r of t r a n s f e r . Upon entry of i
order of transfer by the clerk of the Supreme Cou
that clerk shall immediately transmit the original
the order to the clerk of the Court of Appeals and g.
notice of entry by mail to each party to the proce.
ing. The clerk of the Supreme Court shall mak«
note in the docket of that court of the service by m«
The clerk of the Supreme Court shall also notify t
clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken
the order of transfer and shall attach a copy of t
order.
(c) R e c e i p t of o r d e r of t r a n s f e r b y C o u r t of A
p e a l s . Upon receipt of the original order of trans,
from the clerk of the Supreme Court, the clerk of t
Court of Appeals shall enter the appeal upon i
Court of Appeals docket. Notice that the appeal 1
been docketed in the Court of Appeals shall the
upon be immediately given by the clerk of the Co>
of Appeals to each party to the proceeding in i
same manner as is prescribed by Rule 39(c) of th.
rules.
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